Post-graduate and Research Department Series No. 14

"Professor K. V. Abhyankar Memorial Lectures"

[First Series]

THE VĀKYAPADĪYA: SOME PROBLEMS

K. A. SUBRAMANIA IYER

Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute

POONA, India

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Revised Price Rs. 20-00

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Printed at : The Bhandarkar Institute Press,
Poona 411004, India.

Published by : R. N. Dandekar, Honorary Secretary,
Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute,
Poona 411004, India.

FOREWORD

In the early hours of the night of December 1, 1976, Professor Kashinath Vasudev *alias* Bapusaheb Abhyankar met his tragic end. Even now, after the lapse of three years and more, one shudders at the blood-curdling memory of the horrendous crime of which he was an utterly innocent victim. Who, from among the workers of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute who, on that fateful day, had spoken and discussed things with Professor Abhyankar at the Institute, in the usual hearty manner, till about 5 p. m., could have imagined that, within the short span of about three hours, an outrageous act was going to be perpetrated as the result of which the Sanskrit Muse was going to be bereaved of one of her distinguished sons and a whole tradition of learning was going to be irrevocably brought to an end?

On this occasion, it is not possible - nor is it necessary - to dilate upon the rich and varied contributions which Professor Abhyankar has made to Sanskrit studies in general and Pāṇinian studies in particular. I often used to say that if, at any time, Pāṇini himself felt perplexed about something which he had written, he might consult Professor Abhyankar and get the matter straightened up. I also used to tell Professor Abhyankar that his presence at the Bhandarkar Institute tended to make younger scholars idle. For, whenever they had any difficulty in grammar, instead of taking the trouble of hunting for the relevant references in the original texts, they simply turned to him because they knew that the whole Vyākaraṇa-Śāstra was on the tip of his tongue. Professor Abhyankar had been associated with this Institute, in various capacities, almost since its inception. Many important texts, edited by him, have been included among the Institute's publications. At the time of his death, he was Chairman of the Executive Board of the Institute.

Some time after the tragic death of Professor Abhyankar his sons and daughters made over to the Institute a sizeable amount

of money to enable it to found a Lectureship in memory of their revered father. It is, indeed, gratifying that we have been able to get Professor K. A. Subramania Iyer, who, as you see, is fairly active though advanced in age, to deliver the first series of the "Professor K. V. Abhyankar Memorial Lectures". I knew in how high esteem Professor Abhyankar and Professor Iyer held each other. Therefore, even before the Abhyankar Memorial Lectureship was formally instituted, we had made up our mind to invite Professor Iyer to be the first lecturer. Today Professor Iyer can be justifiably designated the Doyen of Sanskritists in India. He served, long and with distinction, as Professor of Sanskrit in Lucknow University, and, under his able stewardship, the department of Sanskrit there soon became an active centre of Sanskrit studies and research. He has also served as Vice-Chancellor of Lucknow University and the Varanaseya Sanskrit University. And who would fail to enthuse over his *magnum opus* on Bhartṛhari and the *Vākyapadīya*? I have often felt that the overemphasis on the linguistic aspect of the Pāṇinian thought has considerably hindered a proper appreciation of its contribution to logic and semiotics. Professor Iyer's magnificent work has gone a long way in setting the matter in the right perspective. His present "Abhyankar Memorial Lectures" will, I am sure, confirm what I have said.

Professor Iyer, we are greatly beholden to you for having kindly accepted our invitation to deliver the first series of "Professor K. V. Abhyankar Memorial Lectures".

Post-script

It is most unfortunate that I have to add a melancholy post-script to the foregoing brief speech which I had made while introducing Professor Iyer's inaugural lecture and which I had intended to make serve as a Foreword to the printed text of his three lectures. Professor Iyer arrived in Poona with his wife late in the morning of March 27, 1980. He expressed to me, more than once, his great joy at being able to visit Poona after more than twelve years and to meet his old friends and colleagues and

more particularly at the opportunity which had come his way of paying grateful homage to the memory of Professor K. V. Abhyankar to whom he owed so much. As scheduled, he delivered his first Lecture on "Some Aspects of Bhartṛhari's *Śabdādvaita*" at the Institute in the evening of March 28, 1980, with Tarkatīrtha Dr. Lakshman Sastri Joshi in the chair, and his second lecture on "Bhartṛhari on *Sphoṭa*" in the evening of March 29 with Professor A. M. Ghatage in the chair. Early in the afternoon of March 30, 1980, on which day he was to have delivered his third and final lecture on "The *Vākyapadīya* and the *Pramāṇas*", Professor Iyer suffered a massive heart-attack and was soon removed to the Institute of Cardiology attached to a well-known Nursing Home in Poona. However, in spite of the best efforts of the doctors there, Professor Iyer expired in the morning of March 31. Could there have been a sadder irony than this ?

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LECTURE I

SOME ASPECTS OF BHARTṚHARI'S *ŚABDĀDVAITA*

1. (a) *Vākyapadīya* is supposed to deal with *vākya* and *pada*. Of its three Kāṇḍas, the second and the third deal with these two subjects. The first is called Brahmakāṇḍa. What is the relevance of speaking about Brahman at the beginning?

(b) Of the eight topics dealt with in the *Vākyapadīya* Brahman would come under *phala* or *prayojana*.

(c) Bhartṛhari speaks about Brahman, not only because it is the ultimate goal to be reached, but also because it is the ultimate source of everything. It is, therefore, the source of the *vākya* and of the *pada*, the real subject-matter of the *Vākyapadīya*. He begins with Brahman, in order to tell the story from the very beginning.

(d) The main ideas of Bhartṛhari regarding Brahman, the ultimate Reality, are given in the first four Kārikās of Kāṇḍa I. There are many other Kārikās where the main ideas are supplemented or elaborated. In fact, one can say that right through the *Vākyapadīya*, Bhartṛhari has this ultimate reality at the back of his mind, even when he is dealing with what appear to be purely linguistic or grammatical topics. It runs like a thread right through his work and gives it a kind of unity. When he is speaking about *jāti* or *dravya*, *sādhana* or *kriyā*, *dik* or *kāla*, he somehow connects it all with Brahman.

The main ideas then are:

(a) The ultimate Reality, Brahman, which is without beginning and end, is of the nature of the word (*śabdatattva*) and from it proceeds the whole Universe.

(b) The ultimate Reality is One, but it manifests itself as many because of its many powers. It is not different from its powers but it appears to be different.

(c) Time is one of the powers of Brahman, in fact, the most important of them. It is One, but divisions are superimposed on it. On it depend all the different kinds of actions and changes (*ṣaḍ bhāvavikārāḥ*) which bring about multiplicity in Existence or Being.

(d) The ultimate Reality, which is One, contains all the seeds of all multiplicity. It manifests itself as the Experiencer, the Experienced, and the Experience itself.

Brahman is Śabdatattva

(a) Bhartṛhari says that the idea that the world comes from the word is already in the Vedas. The *Vṛtti* also says that, in the Vedas, the word (Vāk) has been declared to be the ultimate cause of everything and quotes Vedic passages in support of the statement. Some of these passages are in prose while the others are *ṛks*. Unfortunately, these have not been traced in the Vedic texts which we know. The available Vedic literature, including both the Mantra portion and the Brāhmaṇa portion, is full of statements about Vāk and Brahman in different contexts. Some of them certainly contain the idea that Brahman is the ultimate source of everything while others convey the idea that Vāk is the origin of everything. After that, it is but one step to identify Brahman with Vāk. In *RV*. X. 125 Vāk identifies herself with everything in the Universe, and Sāyaṇa interprets this *sūkta* in a purely Vedantic sense.

(b) Some non-Vedic texts are also quoted as authority for this notion. They are said to be taken from *purākalpa*, but it is not clear what *purākalpa* is.

Arguments

1. The doctrine that Brahman is of the nature of the word (*śabdatattva*) is based not merely on Vedic texts but also on reasoning. The Kārikās themselves do not present the reasoning. The commentary does it on the basis of certain statements found in the Kārikās in a different context, in the

context of the place of the word in all our knowledge and in all our dealings and communications with others. The main argument is based on a principle which all systems of philosophy have adopted, namely, that the cause persists in all its effects and that the nature of the cause can be deduced by observing what persists in all effects. We see that gold runs through all objects made of gold. By looking at them, we can conclude that gold is the original material out of which they are all made. Similarly, Sāṅkhyas argue that everything in the world is associated with pleasure, pain, and delusion and so their root cause must be something consisting of these three qualities, that is Pradhāna. Applying the same reasoning we see that our knowledge of everything is intertwined with the word. A knowledge which is not so intertwined is not knowledge at all. We cannot cognize an object through the word without cognizing the word first. We find that all manifestations of Brahman are intertwined with the word and so it is concluded that their root cause Brahman must be of the nature of the word, that is, it must be *śabdatattva*.[1]

2. If the word were merely a means of knowledge as the senses are, we should be able to cognize the object through the word, even when the word itself is not cognized. We can see an object through our sense of vision without cognizing our sense of vision itself. But we cannot cognize an object through the word without cognizing the word itself first.

When we cognize an object through the word, our cognition takes the form of identity, unlike what happens when we infer fire from smoke. Our verbal cognition of a jar takes the form of identity. We say this is a jar. 'Jar' is a word and jar is also the object. The two become identified in our cognition. So we conclude that the object is not different from the word. It is the word which has become the object. As objects figure in the cognition and as cognitions in which objects figure are formulated

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1. तत्तु भिन्नरूपाभिमतानामपि विकाराणां प्रकृत्यन्वयित्वात् शब्दोपग्राह्यतया शब्दोपग्राहितया च शब्दतत्त्वमित्यभिधीयते । *Vṛtti* on *Vāk.* (ed. K. A. Subramania Iyer, Poona) I. 1. pp. 6–7.

in words, we conclude that objects and cognitions are essentially derived from words, that they are products of the word. Consciousness of the word forms part and parcel of our knowledge of objects. Their knowledge depends upon the word. That is why objects are said to be *śabdopagrāhiṇaḥ*.

3. Bhartṛhari stresses the importance and significance of all knowledge being intertwined with the word. By word or *śabda*, he does not mean in this context the manifested word of any language which is uttered by the speaker and heard by the listener, because this is true even in the case of newly-born babies who do not know any language yet. Even their cognition is intertwined with the word. Otherwise they would not be able to understand and to act as soon as they are born. They make movements of their vocal organs either for utterance of sounds or for eating.[2] The baby is capable of applying its mind to the making of particular efforts to produce particular sounds or to do particular acts. That is because he is born with germs of knowledge and with know-how. It is there in the baby as a *saṁskāra*, called *śabdabhāvanā*. It is a *saṁskāra* of its knowledge of a language in a previous existence. When due to the working of its *adṛṣṭa*, it is aroused in this life, the baby is able to understand and to act. It is assumed that when the baby acts, it has understood the situation and knows what it has to do, just like grown-up people. The commentary points out that it acts through its *pratibhā* and it would have no *pratibhā* if its *śabdabhāvanā* were not already there.[3] It is emphasised that no human effort can impart this *pratibhā* to the baby. It is a state in which the word and the object are mixed up as one, without differentiation.

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2. इतिकर्तव्यता लोके सर्वा शब्दव्यपाश्रया ।
यां पूर्वाहितसंस्कारो बालोऽपि प्रतिपद्यते ॥ *Vāk.* I. 113.

3. अनादिश्चैषा शब्दभावना प्रतिपुरुषमवस्थितज्ञानबीजपरिग्रहा । न ह्येतस्याः कथञ्चित् पौरुषेयत्वं संभवति । तथा ह्यनुपदेशसाध्याः प्रतिभागम्या एव करणविन्यासादयः । *Vāk.* I. p. 187.

If the knowledge of the newly-born baby who does not know any language yet is intertwined with the word, it is only natural that what is called *avikalpajñāna* should also be so, though it is usually considered to be that moment of perception in which the name of the object does not figure. In Bhartṛhari, if it is knowledge at all, it has to be intertwined with the word, not of course the specific name of the object but a general word such as a pronoun. Otherwise, one cannot explain the clear cognition of the name in the second stage, the *savikalpaka* stage, in which what was subtle and latent in the previous stage becomes clear and patent. When one hears a verse recited for the first time, one does not grasp it fully. Only one grasps it in a very vague way. But even this vague cognition leaves an impression, a residual trace which when awakened causes the remembrance of the previous vague cognition. One only remembers that one had a vague cognition of the verse before. One does not remember the verse itself. One just remembers that one did hear some verse or other.[4] But the form of this remembrance is a proof that one's previous cognition was intertwined with the word. If it were not so intertwined, it could neither reveal itself nor reveal the object vaguely. What it all amounts to is that what is called knowledge is also mixed up with the word.

This characteristic of knowledge exists in the cognitions of sleep also. We do give expression in words to our remembrance of deep sleep experience. We say: "I slept very soundly. I did not know a thing." This form which our remembrance takes can be explained only on the assumption that the word in a very subtle form is mixed up with whatever experience we have in deep sleep.

All culture, all the arts and sciences are based on this fact, namely, that our knowledge is intertwined with the word. All communication depends upon that and on successful communica-

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4. स्मृतिकालेऽपि तादृशानामुपलब्धिबीजानामाभिमुख्ये स्मर्तव्येषु श्लोकादिषु प्रकाशानुगममात्रमारूपमिव बुद्धौ विपरिवर्तते कोऽप्यसावनुवाकः श्लोको वा योऽयं मया श्रुतिमात्रेण प्रक्रान्त इति । *Vṛtti* on *Vāk.* I. 116. p. 190 f.

tion of thought depends the development of the arts, crafts and the sciences.[5] This fact is the base of the distinction between *sasaṁjña* and *visaṁjña* in this world.[6] Any thing which has not that kind of knowledge and therefore cannot engage in purposeful activity is called *visaṁjña*. Anything which has this kind of knowledge can engage in conscious activity and can be called *sasāṁjña*. It is this fact which enables us to recognise and identify the objects which we see and thus enables us to act towards them. Experience of pleasure and pain, happiness and unhappiness, also requires this intertwining with the word because here also there is need for recognition and identification.

Both consciousness of oneself and of other objects requires that our consciousness should be intertwined with the word. If consciousness of all kinds is thus mixed up with the word, the question arises whether the two are different from each other or are identical. To judge from the *Vṛtti*, both the views were held in the old days. The Kārikā says that consciousness is never without intermixture with the word. Some understood this to mean that consciousness and the word were two distinct things. Others, on the other hand, understood Bhartṛhari to mean that consciousness was essentially of the nature of the word.[7] After going through all these texts, one begins to wonder what could be the nature of that *śabda* or *Vāk* which is identified with Brahman and which runs through all its manifestations, which is there in the new-born baby, in sleep, in all the cognitions of the wakeful state, and even in animals and birds, in fact anywhere where there is knowledge. Bhartṛhari says :

वाग्रूपता चेदुत्क्रामेदवबोधस्य शाश्वती ।
न प्रकाशः प्रकाशेत सा हि प्रत्यवमर्शिनी ॥ *Vāk*. I. 116.

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5. विद्यादयश्च वाग्रूपायां बुद्धौ निबद्धाः । *Vṛtti*. on *Vāk*. I. 117.

6. योऽयं चैतन्ये वाग्रूपतानुगमस्तेन लोके ससंज्ञो विसंज्ञ इति उपदेशः क्रियते । एवं ह्याह- अर्थक्रियासु वाक् सर्वान् समीहयति देहिनः । तदुत्क्रान्तौ विसंज्ञोऽयं दृश्यते काष्ठकुड्यवत् । *Vṛtti*. on *Vāk*. I. 118.

7. तस्माच्चितिक्रियारूपमलब्धवाक्शक्तिपरिग्रहं न विद्यते । वाक्तत्त्वरूपमेव च्चितिक्रियारूपमित्यन्ये । *Vṛtti* on *Vāk*. I. 118.

If consciousness were not of the nature of Vāk, it would not illuminate, it would not be knowledge. It is Vāk which is *pratyavamarśinī* and there cannot be knowledge without *pratyavamarśa*. What is *pratyavamarśa*? Unfortunately, the oldest commentary, the *Vṛtti*, does not explain the expression and we do not have the *Śabdaprabhā* of Helārāja on the first Kāṇḍa of the *Vākyapadīya*. I believe, however, that we can get some help from the *Pratyabhijñā* literature of Kashmir in understanding it. This system has been much influenced by Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya*. Somānanda, Utpala, and Abhinavagupta knew the *Vākyapadīya* and the *Vṛtti*. Abhinavagupta, especially, was steeped in the *Vākyapadīya*. Quotations from a commentary of his on the third Kāṇḍa of the *Vākyapadīya* are available, though the commentary itself is not available.

What is stated here is that *vimarśa* is the very essence of *prakāśa* or knowledge or consciousness. But for that, *prakāśa* would not be knowledge at all. Secondly, this *vimarśa* is called *parā vāk*. Now how did they understand *vimarśa* or *parā vāk*? To explain the idea that *prakāśa* without *vimarśa* would not be *prakāśa* at all, they generally take the example of the crystal (*sphaṭika*). A crystal has this much in common with knowledge or consciousness that it can reflect objects. But there is a vital difference. When the crystal reflects an object, it is not conscious of itself as reflecting it nor is it conscious of the object which it reflects. That is why we say that the crystal is *jaḍa* (inert), mere matter. When we know something, we know ourselves as knowing it and know the object also. Thus the mixture of the consciousness of the Self and the object is called *vimarśa*. It is this aspect of consciousness which enables one to recognise and identify things; and it exists even in animals and new-born babies, which do not know any language yet. As the baby grows older and learns to think and use a language, it is this aspect of consciousness which is working all the time.

4. The One Reality which is *śabdatattva* becomes many because it is endowed with many powers.[8] Diversity of powers

8. एकमेव यदाम्नातं भिन्नशक्तिव्यपाश्रयात्। *Vāk.* I. 2.

is postulated in order to explain the immense diversity of the products of the cosmos.[9]

All the powers are identical with the One Reality and the One is identical with them, though they appear to be different from one another.[10] Diversity of powers does not take away the unity of the ultimate.[11] Sometimes, however, the *Vṛtti* talks as if one cannot say whether they are identical with the One or not.[12] These powers are said to be not only different from one another but also opposed to one another, because their products seem to be different and opposed to one another. They are *virodhinyaḥ*.[13] In another sense, however, they are not opposed to one another in spite of their effects being mutually contradictory, because after all, they are all powers of the same entity, they are all found in the same substratum. As Vṛṣabha puts it : 'अविरोधिन्यः इति', विरुद्धकार्यप्रसवानुमितविरोधा अप्येकस्मिन्नाधारे यौगपद्येन वृत्तेरविरोधिन्यः । पद्धति on *Vāk.* I. p. 21, ll. 16-17.

5. It is emphasized that the multiplicity of powers does not take away the unitary character of the ultimate Reality. The One, while becoming many, does not give up its unity: एकमेव यदाम्नातम् (*Vāk.* I. 2), एकस्य सर्वबीजस्य (*Vāk.* I. 4), एकस्य तत्त्वादप्रच्युतस्य (*Vṛtti* on *Vāk.* I. 4).

Of the many powers, the names of some are mentioned:

दिक् साधनं क्रिया काल इति वस्त्वभिधायिनः ।
शक्तिरूपे पदार्थानामत्यन्तमनवस्थिताः ॥ *Vāk.* III. *DikS.* 1.

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9. कार्यनानात्वोन्नीयमानः शक्तिभेद एवैकस्य युक्तो न स्वरूपभेदः Helārāja on *Vāk.* III. *JātiS.* 22.

10. अपृथक्त्वेऽपि शक्तिभ्यः पृथक्त्वेनैव वर्तते । *Vāk.* I. 2.
सर्वशक्त्यात्मभूतत्वमेकस्यैवेति निर्णयः । *Vāk.* III. *JātiS.* 22.

11. एकत्वस्याविरोधेन शब्दतत्त्वे ब्रह्मणि समुच्चिता विरोधिन्य आत्मभूताः शक्तयः । *Vṛtti.* on *Vāk.* I. 2, p. 16.

12. भेदसंसर्गसमतिक्रमेण समाविष्टं सर्वाभिः शक्तिभिर्विद्याविद्याप्रविभागरूपमप्रविभागं कालभेददर्शनाभ्यासेन मूर्तिविभागभावनया च व्यवहारानुपातिभिर्धर्माधर्मैः सर्वास्ववस्थास्वनाश्रितादिनिधनं ब्रह्मेति प्रतिज्ञायते । *Vṛtti* on *Vāk.* I. 1, pp. 1–3.

13. विरोधिसदसत्कार्योदयानुमीयमानवैलक्षण्या विरोधिप्रत्ययानुमीयमाना नानात्वाधानाः शक्तय इति । *Paddhati* on *Vāk.* I. 2. p. 16, l. 6 f.

Among the many powers of Brahman - *Śabdatattva* - Bhartṛhari singles out one for mention at the very beginning, that is, in the third stanza of Kāṇḍa I. I mean *kālaśakti*. It is due to this power that all changes take place, resulting in the immense variety of existence which we see.[14] A fairly long section is devoted to Time (Kāla) in the 3rd Kāṇḍa.

The importance which Bhartṛhari attaches to time in the process of the manifestation of the Cosmos can be seen in the way in which he talks about it. It is with the help of this power called Kāla that the Almighty creates the Cosmos in a particular order which is so vital to it, since, without it there would only be confusion. Because of this, the Almighty himself gets the name of Kāla, says Bhartṛhari. As he puts it :

जलयन्त्रसमावेशसदृशीभिः प्रवृत्तिभिः ।
स कलाः कलयन् सर्वाः कालाख्यां लभते विभुः ॥ *Vāk.* III. *KālaS.* 14.

All the temporal order which we see in the Cosmos is due to this *kālaśakti* of Brahman. It performs two functions, called *pratibandha* and *abhyanujñā*. Through its first function, it prevents anything from coming into existence before its time, and, through its second function, it sees to it that everything does appear at the right time. As a result of these two functions, there is a temporal order in the phenomena which constitute the cosmos. This is a causal power and it differs from the powers of the other causes because it does not depend upon anything else for its operation. It is a kind of independence of Brahman which is *vibhu*. Helārāja explains the word *vibhu* as *svatantra* ' independent ' and adds *ata eva svātantryaśaktiḥ kāla iti vākyapadīye siddhāntitam* (on *Vāk*. III. *loc. cit.*). The application of the word *svātantrya* to Kāla is much older than Helārāja because it is there already in the *Vṛtti* which says : *kālākhyena hi svātantryeṇa sarvāḥ paratantrā janmavatyaḥ śaktayaḥ samāviṣṭāḥ kālaśaktivṛttim anupatanti* : (*Vṛtti* on *Vāk*. I. 3). While Kāla as the causal power is called

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14. अध्याहितकलां यस्य कालशक्तिमुपाश्रिताः ।
जन्मादयो विकाराः षड् भावभेदस्य योनयः ॥ *Vāk.* I. 3.

svatantra, the other causal powers found in the cosmos are said to be *paratantra* in this very passage. They all depend upon Kāla for doing their work. In that sense Kāla is an auxiliary cause of all products in this Cosmos. As the *Vṛtti* puts it : सर्वेषां हि विकाराणां कारणान्तरेष्वप्यपेक्षावतां प्रतिबद्धजन्मनामभ्यनुज्ञया सहकारिकारणं कालः। *Vṛtti* on *Vāk*. I. 3.

It is only when Kāla exercises its function called *abhyanujñā* 'giving permission' that any product can come into existence. Till then, its coming into existence is obstructed (*pratibaddha-janmanām*). This function of preventing something from coming before its time also prevents it from lasting beyond its time and in that aspect it is the power called *jarā* of Kāla which is itself a power. In fact Bhartṛhari uses the notion of power (*śakti*) rather generously. Not only has the ultimate Reality infinite powers, but the powers themselves are spoken of as having powers of their own. He not only speaks about the *śakti* called *jarā*, but speaks about the present, the past, and the future as three powers of Kāla. Kāla is really one, but the present, the past, and the future appear to be its divisions. It has really no divisions. They are three powers rather than divisions. Due to these three powers, things appear and disappear. The past and the future hide objects whereas the present reveals them. They are like light and shade. The past and the future represent shade and the present represents light. The past and the future stand for *tamo-guṇa* and the present for *sattvaguṇa*. *Rajoguṇa* stands for Time in general because Kāla is activity, creativity. As Bhartṛhari puts it :

एकस्य शक्तयस्तिस्रः कालस्य समवस्थिताः।
यत्संबन्धेन भावानां दर्शनादर्शने सताम् ॥
द्वाभ्यां स किल शक्तिभ्यां भावानां वरणात्मकः।
शक्तिस्तु वर्तमानाख्या भावरूपप्रकाशिनी ॥ *Vāk*. III. *KālaS*. 49–50.

The multiplicity of the powers of Kāla does not prevent Kāla from being One, just as the multiplicity of the powers of Brahman does not take away its Unity. The fact is that the absolutely undifferentiated, whether it be Brahman or Kāla, cannot be brought into worldly transactions (*vyavahāra*). For that purpose

some differentiation has to be introduced, though it has no reality. As Helārāja puts it : निरुपाधिर्द्रव्यस्वभावो व्यवहारं नापततीत्येकत्वादि-संख्यासमवायादेकादिव्यवहारः । (on *Vāk*. III. *KālaS*. 7).

Some divide the undifferentiated on some basis or other but the division has only a practical purpose. It is not real. We divide Time (Kāla) on the basis of the different actions and changes which take place in the Universe and use such expressions as *kṛta*, *tretā*, *dvāpara*, *kali*, *atīta*, *anāgata*, *bhaviṣyat*, *vasanta*, *grīṣma*, *varṣā*, etc., *cira*, *kṣipra*, etc. But all this is not real. It is only a way of talking. As Helārāja puts : कालाख्यस्य जगत्कारणस्य मुख्यो भेदो नास्ति। ··· शक्तिभेदात्, कार्यभेदोपपत्तौ कालभेदकल्पना निर्निमित्ता । (on *Vāk*. III. *KālaS*. 49).

6. The chief point about Kāla is that it is the chief power of Brahma-Śabdatattva, responsible for the fact that the different phenomena of the universe take place in a temporal order. As Helārāja puts it — एवं तावत् प्रथमः कालव्यापारोऽत्र क्रमावभासः । (on *Vāk*. III. *KālaS*. 46).

7. I have said nothing so far about *Avidyāśakti*. Bhartṛhari does connect Kāla with Avidyā. He says that the first thing which happens in the state of Avidyā is the appearance of Kāla.[15]

In the state of Vidyā, that is, in Brahman, there is no place for Kāla. Due to its powers, Brahman manifests itself as *bhoktā*, *bhoktavya*, and *bhoga*. Sometimes they are said to be *draṣṭā*, *dṛśyam*, *darśanam* and *prayojanam*. *Bhoktavya* is often divided into *vācaka* and *vācya*. These two now require closer examination.

15. शक्त्यात्मदेवतापक्षैर्भिन्नं कालस्य दर्शनम् ।
प्रथमं तदविद्यायां यद् विद्यायां न विद्यते ॥ *Vāk*. III. *KālaS*. 62.

LECTURE II

BHARTṚHARI ON *SPHOṬA*

1. The Brahman-Śabdatattva contains within itself the seeds of the whole Universe which emanates from it. What the whole Universe consists of is stated differently on different occasions without there being any contradiction between these statements. At the very beginning of the *Vākyapadīya*, it is declared that the Brahman-Śabdatattva manifests itself as the experiencer, the object experienced, and the experience itself.[1] In other words, the Many which emerges out of the One can be brought under these three headings. On another occasion, a fourth category is added, namely, the purpose or goal of experience.[2] The *Vṛtti* quotes an ancient text which mentions *mūrtivivarta* (the manifestation of the different objects of the world located in space) and *kriyāvivarta* (the manifestation consisting of actions and processes, taking place in time) as the two chief constituents of the Cosmos. In some places, Helārāja also refers to the Universe as consisting of these two kinds of *vivarta*.[3] But these two *vivartas* can cover only what Bhartṛhari calls *bhoktavya* (the thing to be experienced), and leaves out the experiencer and the experience. A closely related way of looking at the same thing is to say that the Universe consists of the *siddha*, finished concrete objects or what is looked upon as such and secondly *sādhya*, actions and processes in the course of being accomplished or what is looked upon as such. Lastly, one often comes across the statement that the Universe consists of the *vācya* and the *vācaka*, that is, whatever can be expressed in words and the words which express them. These two categories do not

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1. एकस्य सर्वबीजस्य यस्य चेयमनेकधा ।
भोक्तृभोक्तव्यरूपेण भोगरूपेण च स्थितिः ॥ *Vāk.* I. 4.

2. तद् दृश्यं दर्शनं द्रष्टा दर्शने च प्रयोजनम् । *Vāk.* III. *DraS.* 14.

3. कालशक्त्यवच्छिन्नो हि क्रियाविवर्तः । दिक्छक्त्यवच्छिन्नश्च मूर्तिविवर्त इति मूर्तिक्रियाविवर्तरूपं विश्वं प्रतिपादितम् । on *Vāk.* III. *DravyaS.* 14. p. 117 ll. 8f.

cover the whole Cosmos. They cover the objective aspect of it but not the subjective aspect consisting of all the individual selves and their infinite experience.

2. Whatever be the aspects or categories in terms of which one describes the Universe, they all exist as seeds (*bīja*) or potentialities (*śakti*) in the ultimate Reality and as One with it. When they emanate from it, they become actualities and present themselves as different not only from the One but also from one another. The words which convey the things and the things which are conveyed by the words also exist as potentialities or powers (*śakti*) within it and emanate from it as distinct from one another. Similarly, knowledge and the things known also exist as one within it and emanate from it as distinct from one another. The experiences and the things experienced also at first exist as one with the ultimate, but emerge as distinct from one another. Of all the things which emanate from the Brahman-Śabdatattva, we are concerned with the manifestation of the *vācya* and *vācaka* or in other words of the *artha* and the *śabda*. In ancient days, there was a good deal of speculation in the circle of phoneticians (*śikṣākārāḥ*) as to the origin or the material cause of the audible word or sound (*śabda*). Some held that words or sounds were transformations of air, others held that they were transformations of atoms, and others still that they were transformations of knowledge or consciousness (*jñāna*).[4]

The first view seems to refer to the fact that at the time of utterance, the effort of the speaker pushes the inner air outwards and when it strikes at the different points and organs of articulation, sounds are produced. Thus this view relates only to the most external or physical aspect of production of speech sounds. The statement of the second view that sounds are transformations of atoms is not free from doubt. In what sense is the word atom (*aṇu*) to be taken? Is it to be taken in the sense of the Vaiśeṣikas who recognize only four kinds of atoms, namely, those

4. वायोरणूनां ज्ञानस्य शब्दत्वापत्तिरिष्यते ।
कैश्चिद् दर्शनभेदो हि प्रवादेष्वनवस्थितः ॥ *Vāk.* I.107.

of earth, air, water, and fire, or is it to be understood as equal to the *tanmātra* of the Sāṅkhyas ? The Vaiśeṣikas do not recognise atoms of sound, because the latter is a quality of *ākāśa* according to them and only a substance can be in the state of atoms. The Sāṅkhya recognises five kinds of *tanmātra* of which *śabda* is one and some scholars like Nāgeśa are of the view that the word *aṇu* in the text in question refers to the *śabdatanmātra*. It is stated that when the *śabdaparamāṇus* are prompted by the inner air expelled by the speaker at the time when their power to produce their effects is mature, they are transformed into gross speech. This is only a literal interpretation of the relevant text.[5] What it really means is not clear. We now come to the third view that it is knowledge or consciousness which is transformed into audible words. Kaiyaṭa says in his *Pradpīa* on P. 1. 4. 29 that this was the view of the Bhāṣyakāra. The *Vṛtti* on *Vāk*. I. 107 quotes four stanzas from some ancient work which are supposed to state this view and they have been made use of by later writers like Nāgeśa. They describe the externalisation of the inner word through different stages.[6] The main idea is that it is the subtle inner word (*sūkṣmā vāk*) that becomes the knower and then in order to reveal himself becomes the external word. To say that the subtle word, which is no other than the Word-Principle, becomes the knower means that it takes the form of mind (*manas*) or intellect (*buddhi*) and ultimately becomes the fully-manifested external word. In the process described in these

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5. स्वशक्तौ व्यज्यमानायां प्रयत्नेन समीरिताः ।
अभ्राणीव प्रचीयन्ते शब्दाख्याः परमाणवः ।
Vāk. I. p. 174; ll. 1 f.

6. अथायमान्तरो ज्ञाता सूक्ष्मे वागात्मनि स्थितः ।
व्यक्तये स्वस्य रूपस्य शब्दत्वेन विवर्तते ॥
स मनोभावमापद्य तेजसा पाकमागतः ।
वायुमाविशति प्राणमथासौ समुदीर्यते ॥
अन्तःकरणतत्त्वस्य वायुराश्रयतां गतः ।
तद्धर्मेण समाविष्टस्तेजसैव विवर्तते ॥
विभजन् स्वात्मनो ग्रन्थीन् श्रुतिरूपैः पृथग्विधैः ।
प्राणो वर्णानभिव्यज्य वर्णेष्वेवोपलीयते ॥ *Vāk*. I. p. 174 f., vv. 111–115.

stages, there is mention of *vāyu* and *prāṇa* also. The *Pāṇinīya Śikṣā* also describes the process. It says that the Self cognises the objects with the mind and endows it with the desire to give expression to them. The mind strikes at the bodily energy and that energy sets the breath in motion. What is to be noted in the process of the *śabdatattva* becoming fully externalised (*vyaktaśabda*) is that various things are involved in it, according to the authors of the *Śikṣā*, approvingly quoted in the *Vṛtti.* They are : *ātmā*, *buddhi* or *manas*, *prāṇa* or *vāyu*, *tejas* or *kāyāgni*, *sthāna* and *karaṇa* (points and organs of articulation). Bhartṛhari also seems to be referring to the process when he says that the power of the word becomes associated with the mind, the *prāṇa* and the points of articulation and thus becomes diversified. That, before the word is fully externalised, the points and organs of articulation have to play a part is rather obvious. Its association with the mind and the *prāṇa* is perhaps not quite so obvious; and so, that is emphasized by the *Vṛtti* when it says that the word has two bases, the *prāṇa* and the *buddhi.*[7] On the basis of what the commentary says, Bhartṛhari seems to have something like this in mind when he says that the *śakti* of the word becomes associated with the *buddhi*, the *prāṇa* and the *sthāna* and *karaṇa*.

3. The speaker has something to say and he thinks of the appropriate words for expressing it. His later utterance, consisting of making movements of his vocal organs, would depend upon the words which he has already thought of. These words which he has in his mind (*buddhi*) are spoken of as a kind of power (*śakti*) because they will bring about the manifested words. But *buddhi* by itself cannot result in utterance. It requires the help of *prāṇa*, the motor principle within. So in a way, it transfers its power to *prāṇa* and so now it becomes the power of *prāṇa*. The power of *buddhi* and that of *prāṇa* cooperate with each other in producing the utterance. The motor principle is one without differentiation and unless it is differen-

7. शब्दः खलु प्राणाधिष्ठानो बुध्यधिष्ठानश्च । *Vāk.* I. p. 179, l. 2 f.

tiated, the particular sounds required for the manifestation of the words already thought of cannot be produced. It is the points and organs (*sthāna* and *karaṇa*) of articulation which bring about differentiation in *prāṇa*, the motor-principle. When *prāṇa* strikes against particular points and organs, the sounds required are produced and they manifest the words which are expressive.

When the process of externalisation is complete, the words uttered can be heard by others. But there are degrees in this process and these degrees are referred to by the words *paramopāṁśu* and *upāṁśu*. These two degrees of externalisation are also available to the average man. When the words are still in the mind and the process of externalisation has not begun at all, though differentiation into word and meaning and into different sounds has begun and the words can be grasped by the speaker's mind and not by the ear, it is a very early stage of externalisation and it is called *paramopāṁśu*.[8] Here *prāṇa* plays no part at all. Another degree of externalisation is that in which *prāṇa* begins to play a part and so utterance begins, but an utterance which others cannot hear and is audible to the speaker only. It is called *upāṁśu*.[9]

The word thus externalised, whether completely or incompletely, is said to be expressive (*vācaka*). We saw that this word has a deeper source than *buddhi*. It comes from the Word-Principle within, the sequenceless subtle word (*akramā sūkṣmā vāk*). As soon as it enters into *buddhi* differentiation takes place. It stands now in relation to what it conveys. It is *vācaka*, the expressive word; and what it conveys is *vācya*, the expressed. This is the *madhyamā* stage, if we look upon the three stages as relating to the process of externalisation which is taking place all the time at the time of communication. This differentiation into *vācya* and *vācaka* is an important aspect of manifesta-

8. अन्तरेण तु प्राणवृत्त्यनुग्रहं यत्र केवलमेव बुद्धौ समाविष्टरूपो बुद्ध्युपादान एव शब्दात्मा तत्परमोपांशु । *Vṛtti* on *Vāk.* II. 19.

9. तत्र प्राणवृत्त्यनुग्रहे सत्येव यत्र शब्दरूपं परैरसंवेद्यं भवति तदुपांशु । *Ibid.*

tion. Both of them already exist potentially in the Brahman-Śabdatattva as one with it and as identical with each other. The word and the meaning are differentiations of one and the same self and are not really different from each other, says Bhartṛhari.[10] The power of being the conveyor (*śrutiśakti, prakāśakatvam*) and the power of being the conveyed, the symbolised (*arthaśakti, prakāśyatvam*) are always inherent in the *śabdatattva* and it is they which are actualised or manifested when we try to say something.[11]

4. The first differentiation, then, which takes place as soon as the word enters into *buddhi* stage is into *vācaka* and *vācya*, the expressive element and the expressed element. The first is not yet audible but is destined to become so when the process of externalisation is more advanced when it is deployed as the sounds which are uttered by the speaker and heard by the hearer. The second is grasped by the mind of the speaker before he begins to speak and when the process of externalisation is complete, it is grasped by the hearer also. When the hearer also grasps it, communication has taken place. The first is called the word (*śabda*) because it is eternally linked to the second, its meaning (*artha*) and when it is fully externalised, it has the capacity to bring the second to the mind of the hearer. The two, *śabda* and *artha*, stand in relation to each other, they face each other, and it is then that they are said to be *vācaka* and *vācya*, the expressive word and the expressed meaning. They are also said to be cause (*kāraṇa*) and effect (*kārya*). That is why Bhartṛhari has declared that the relation in which they stand towards each other can be looked upon as that of illuminator and illuminated (*prakāśaka-prakāśyatvam*) and as that of cause and effect (*kārya-kāraṇarūpatā*). This subject will be dealt with in a separate section.

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10. एकस्यैवात्मनो भेदौ शब्दार्थावपृथक्स्थितौ । *Vāk.* II. 31.

11. (अ) अक्रमे तु वागात्मनि श्रुत्यर्थशक्ती संसृज्येते । *Vāk.* I. p. 102, l. 4.

(ब) प्रकाशकप्रकाश्यत्वं कार्यकारणरूपता ।
अन्तर्मात्रात्मनस्तस्य शब्दतत्त्वस्य सर्वदा । *Vāk.* II. 32.

These two things exist even in the case of new-born babies who do not know any language yet. Originally, then, the word which is *vācaka* has not the form of any particular language, but as the baby grows older and learns the language of the speech community to which it belongs, it assumes the form of that language. Bhartṛhari emphasised that the expressive word which stands facing the expressed meaning has primarily the form of the indivisible sentence and only secondarily of individual words and phonemes. It is the sentence which is primarily the expressive unit (*vācaka*). The expressed element (*vācya*) is also an indivisible unit, a complex and complete idea involving some process or action together with the accessories that help in its accomplishment, all determining one another and intimately connected with one another. The problem of communication is to transfer these two indivisible units from the speaker to the hearer. They can be transferred only through certain verbal elements which have not the same reality but which we have to make use of for want of a better method of transferring the two real elements, the *vācaka* and the *vācya.*

In *Vāk.* I. 44, according to tradltion, Bhartṛhari begins his treatment of two kinds of words, included among the eight topics declared by himself to form the subject matter of the *Vākyapadīya.* There he tells us that in connection with the expressive word, one has to distinguish between two things : (1) that element which is the cause of the manifestation, (2) that element which, when manifested, conveys the meaning. Of these, the latter is the real word, the *vācaka* and the former is what manifests it. It is through the former that the indivisible expressive word is manifested and transferred to the hearer. Patañjali, in his *Mahābhāṣya* also makes a distinction between that which conveys the object, the meaning and that which is mere sound (*dhvani*); but he does not say anywhere clearly that the latter manifests the former. That element which, when manifested conveys the meaning is the real indivisible word, the *vācaka.* It already exists in the speaker and the hearer but it has to be awakened or manifested before it can convey the meaning. That

which awakens it is called the *nimitta.* These two aspects exist only in the case of words which are expressive (*upādānaśabda*) and are therefore used for communication. The sounds which are uttered by the speaker awaken or manifest the expressive word, primarily the sentence, which already exists in the hearer. The manifesting sounds are, therefore, the *nimitta,* the immediate cause of the awakening. It is not they which convey the meaning. That is done by the indivisible, sequenceless word which is manifested because it is eternally associated with it. It always carries, as it were, the reflection of the object and that reflection is the meaning. The main purpose is to convey it.

Judging from the *Vṛtti,* these two aspects were looked upon differently by others. When the speaker utters the expressive word, the sounds come out in a sequence and are heard by the hearer also in a sequence (*krama*). The speaker cannot but utter them in a sequence. He cannot utter them simultaneously. But the expressive word, which already exists within him before utterance, is without sequence; and it is to manifest it that he utters the sounds. So some looked upon the indivisible sequenceless word as the *nimitta,* the cause, of the sounds which the speaker utters and which have sequence. These latter can convey the meaning, but not until the hearer has, through them, grasped the indivisible sequenceless word which is within him. It is that which conveys the meaning, but as that is manifested by the sounds having sequence, they are also looked upon as conveying the meaning (*pratyāyaka*) by others.[12] The fact is that these others start from the speaker. But if one starts from the hearer as Bhartṛhari seems to have done, the sounds having sequence which he hears are the cause of the manifestation of the indivisible sequenceless word which is within him and which, when manifested, conveys the meaning. Thus what has sequence is the *nimitta* of what has none.[13] It is a question of point of view.

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12. लब्धानुसंहारो निमित्तम्, उपजनितक्रमस्तु प्रत्यायक इत्येके ।
Vāk. I. p. 102, l. 2.

13. क्रमवानक्रमनिमित्तम् । *Vāk.* I. p. 120, l. 4.

5. The fundamental idea in all this is that in the self of the speaker and of the hearer, the expressive word and the thing expressed are already present as one and undifferentiated before utterance. In that condition, it is like the yolk in the peahen's egg. All the variety and picturesqueness of the fully-grown peacock is already in it in a potential state. Later it becomes manifest. In the same way, in the self which is of the nature of the word all the variety and differentiation of the gross expressive word and of the thing which is expressed exist in a potential state as identical with one another. It is not merely small units of speech which are merged or exist potentially in the self but big units also. When the desire to speak arises again, the word which had merged before now emerges and assumes the form of sentences and words appearing to have parts arranged in a sequence. This merging and emerging is the only activity of the word. There is no such thing as production and destruction of it.[14] The hearer perceives the differentiated sounds in a sequence and through them grasps the word-unity and, as the speaker, he again manifests it through the multiple sounds. This one goes through three stages. To make three stages clear, the analogy of the painter is brought in. The painter goes through three stages when he paints a picture :—(1) He sees the object in a differentiated state, that is, he sees its parts separately, (2) he has a vision of the whole picture as he wants to paint it, (3) and lastly he paints it part by part. Similarly, the hearer perceives the word differentiated into phonemes merged in him as a unity. As a speaker, he utters it in a differentiated state. Thus the word goes through three stages.[15]

While the word goes through these three stages, its character of being both the conveyer and the conveyed, the illuminator and the illumined, the *grāhaka* and the *grāhya*, is preserved. In so

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14. आण्डभावमिवापन्नो यः क्रतुः शब्दसंज्ञकः ।
वृत्तिस्तस्य क्रियाभूता भागशो लभते क्रमम् ॥ *Vāk.* I. 51.

15. यथैकबुद्धिविषया मूर्तिराक्रियते पटे ।
मूर्त्यन्तरस्य त्रितयमेवं शब्देऽपि दृश्यते ॥ *Vāk.* I, 52.

far as it conveys the object, the meaning, it is *grāhaka* and in so far as its own form is also conveyed it is *grāhya*. In this respect, the word is like knowledge which also reveals itself while revealing the object. In fact the word cannot reveal the object or convey the meaning unless it reveals itself first. To put it differently, nobody can understand a meaning from the word, unless he understands or recognizes the word first. To reveal itself and to reveal the object are looked upon as two powers of the same word, two powers which are not essentially different from the word itself. Both, the speaker and the hearer, have to think of the word first before thinking of the meaning.[16] When the speaker wants to convey a meaning, he first thinks of the word which could express it. Similarly the hearer has to recognize the word before understanding the meaning. To recognize the word does not mean merely to hear the sounds uttered by the speaker. It has to be recognized in all its distinctiveness. The mind has to play as much part in it as the sense of hearing. In fact, more. One is so accustomed to look upon the word as the means of understanding the object that one does not realise that one understands the word first. Ordinary words are used to convey objects of the world or to promote actions relating to the objects of the world. So one does not realise the importance of the words themselves. The fact that the word conveys its own form first is brought home to us on some occasions. In grammar, for instance, operations are taught on the forms of words and not on their meanings, as in the world. The fact that, in some cases, the form becomes important shows that ordinarily it remains subordinate to the meaning which it conveys.

6. That the word reveals itself before revealing the object is the point where it resembles cognition and light on the one hand and differs from the senses, on the other. The senses need not be cognised before they reveal the objects. They do so by their mere existence when they come into contact with the objects. Words, on the other hand, do not reveal objects by their mere

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16. यथा प्रयोक्तुः प्राग् बुद्धिः शब्देष्वेव प्रवर्तते ।
व्यवसायो ग्रहीतॄणामेवं तेष्वेव जायते ॥ *Vāk.* I, 53.

existence. They have to be themselves cognised before they can reveal the objects. Thus all words have two powers :— (1) that of revealing their objects or meanings (*grāhakatva*), (2) that of revealing themselves (*grāhyatva*).[17] These two powers of a word are not really different from the word itself. They are identical with it and with each other, but by a process of abstraction, we can look upon them as different from each other and proceed to do other things which are based on the existence of real difference. One such thing is the use of the words as 'name' (*saṁjñā*) and 'named' (*saṁjñin*). Ordinarily, there is a difference between the name and the named. The word *ghaṭa* is the name and the object *jar* is the named and they are different from each other. The *jar* is what the word *ghaṭa* reveals when it is uttered. The revealed is the 'named'. We saw, however, that the word not only reveals the object but reveals itself also. It not only reveals, it is not only *grāhaka*, it is also the revealed, the *grāhya*. This *grāhya* aspect of the word comes into prominence in the science of Grammar, because grammatical operations are performed on the word as *grāhya*. This is what Pāṇini emphasises in I. 1. 68 of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. Acccording to that, both the *grāhaka* and the *grāhya* are words in contrast to what happens in real life where it is only the name which is the word and the 'named' consists of an object or a process of the phenomenal world. In other words, in grammar, there is the relation of the name and the 'named' between two aspects of the same word. In life, words are used to include actions to be done on things of the world to which they are secondary. In grammar, words are mentioned in order that grammatical operations may be performed on those words which come in actual speech. The former are secondary to the latter. Both in life and in grammar, operations are not done on what is merely secondary, but on what is primary, whether it be an object of the world or a word.[18]

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17. ग्राह्यत्वं ग्राहकत्वं च द्वे शक्ती तेजसो यथा ।
तथैव सर्वशब्दानामेते पृथगवस्थिते ॥ *Vāk.* I. 55.

18. (अ) उच्चरन् परतन्त्रत्वाद् गुणः कार्यैर्न युज्यते ।

(*Continued on the next page*)

From what has been said so far, it follows that every word is a *saṁjñā*, a name, because it reveals something or other. Whatever object belonging to the external world it may reveal, it reveals its own form also. Thus a word has two things which are its 'named' (*saṁjñin*): its own form and some object in the world. Its own form is an invariable element in what it presents as its *saṁjñin*, as its *grāhya*. It is that which is presented first. We saw that, in grammar as contrasted with life, both the *grāhaka* and the *grāhya*, the *saṁjñā* and the *saṁjñin* are words. The word which is mentioned in grammatical rule is the *grāhaka* or the *saṁjñā* and that which it brings to the mind of the speaker and on which the grammatical operation has to be performed is the *saṁjñin* or *grāhya*. Both are words or rather two aspects of the same word. The *grāhaka* aspect of the word is the *saṁjñā* and the *grāhya* aspect of it the *saṁjñin*. Some looked upon the universal aspect of it (*jāti*) as the *saṁjñā* and a particular instance of it (*vyakti*) as the *saṁjñin*. The former is what comes in actual speech and the latter is what is mentioned in a grammatical rule. Others looked upon it *vice-versa*.[19] What is mentioned in a rule is always the *grāhaka* and what comes in actual speech is its *grāhya*. A grammatical operation is done on what comes in actual speech and it can be done only on a particular instance of a word, with, of course, the universal inherent in it. The fact is that the universal and the particular always go together and both are involved in a grammatical operation.

(*Continued from the last page*)

तस्मात् तदर्थैः कार्याणां संबन्धः परिकल्प्यते ॥ *Vāk*. I. 62.

(ब) यथैव गामानय दध्यशानेत्यर्थतन्त्रा श्रुतिः क्रियासु साधनत्वं न प्रतिलभते तथा शब्दान्तरतन्त्रापि । पारार्थ्यस्याविशिष्टत्वात् ।

Vāk. I. p. 120 f., ll. 9.

19. स्वं रूपमिति कैश्चित्तु व्यक्तिः संज्ञोपदिश्यते ।
जातेः कार्याणि संसृष्टा जातिस्तु प्रतिपद्यते ॥

संज्ञिनीं व्यक्तिमिच्छन्ति सूत्रे ग्राह्यामथापरे ।
जातिप्रत्यायिता व्यक्तिः प्रदेशेषूपतिष्ठते ॥ *Vāk*. I. 68-69.

7. All this discussion as to whether it is the universal aspect or a particular instance of a word, which is the name, is possible only on the view that there are infinite particular instances of one word and that its universal inheres in all of them. But there were some thinkers who looked upon the word as one without an infinite number of particular instances in which its so-called universal inheres. They did not see the need to accept the universal at all. Uniformity of cognition or cognition of identity can be explained without having recourse to the concept of the universal. They believed in the one-ness of the word. It is one in all its utterances in spite of any variation in the circumstances.

Whether the word is looked upon as the universal or as a unique eternal entity, it is that which conveys the object or the meaning and it is manifested by its *nimitta*, namely, the sounds which are uttered by the speaker and heard by the hearer. The word *śabda* is sometimes applied to both these aspects of the word, the *nimitta* or the manifesting aspect and the *pratyāyaka* or the meaning-bearing aspect. It is a very general word and it is applied to many things. It is, of course, not convenient to have the same word to donote many things. But Bhartṛhari does use other words also in the course of his exposition of the subject. The more important among them are : *sphoṭa*, *dhvani*, *nāda*, *prākṛtadhvani* and *vaikṛtadhvani*. Theoretically, any one of them can be called *śabda*. We have to note two of them particularly, namely, *dhvani* and *sphoṭa*, because they are the special names of the two aspects of the expressive word mentioned in *Vāk*. I. 44, the stanza with which traditionally Bhartṛhari is supposed to begin his treatment of *śabda*, one of the eight topics of the *Vākyapadīya*. *Dhvani* is the name of the sounds which the speaker utters and which are the *nimitta*, the manifestors of the real word; and *sphoṭa* is the real name of the real word which, when manifested by the *dhvani-s*, conveys the meaning. It is the meaning-bearing aspect of the word.

The word *sphoṭa* has become quite famous. Grammarians have become known as the upholders of the doctrine of *sphoṭa*, the doctrine that the real expressive word is an indivisible entity

called *sphoṭa* which is over and above the sounds and the phonemes (*dhvanis*) which are many in number and are uttered by the speaker in a temporal sequence in order to manifest the *sphoṭa*, which has usually the form of the sentence, and which is an indivisible unity. The word *sphoṭa* occurs already in the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali on P. I. 1. 70; but there it is not applied to the meaning-bearing element. There it means only the permanent aspect of a phoneme, shorn of all variations due to special circumstances. What conveys the meaning is called simply *śabda*. Later commentators like Kaiyaṭa say that by *śabda*, Patañjali meant the *sphoṭa*. This, according to some scholars, is an attribution to Patañjali of what he did not mean. They go further and say that even Bhartṛhari who came much later than Patañjali did not call the meaning-bearing unit *sphoṭa*.

Whatever be the form of the *sphoṭa*, sentence, word or phoneme – Bhartṛhari mentions all the three – it is manifested by the sounds. The process of manifestation is described elaborately in the *Vākyapadīya* with the help of as many as fifteen analogies, each illustrating one aspect of the doctrine. Each sound uttered by the speaker reveals it, the whole of it, the first one vaguely, the second one more clearly and so on until the last one helped by the impressions left by the previous cognitions reveals it in all its clarity and distinctness. The process is compared to the learning of a Vedic passage by heart by reading it or reciting it repeatedly. Each later recitation leaves a clearer impression of the passage than the one left by the previous recitation. The last recitation helped by these impressions, fixes the passage fully and clearly in the memory. In the same way, each later sound manifests the *sphoṭa* more clearly than the preceding one and leaves a clearer impression of it. The cognition produced by each sound, taken by itself is unnamable (*anupākhyeya*) because it is not enough to identify the *sphoṭa*. But each one of them is helpful in the rising of the final clear perception of it. It is grasped clearly in the final cognition the seeds of which had been sown by the sounds, including the final one and which has finally attained maturity. The sounds, while they manifest the word (*sphoṭa*), leave impression-seeds progressively clearer and condu-

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cive to the clear perception of it. Then, the final sound brings to the mind which has now attained maturity or a certain fitness by the awakening of the impressions of the previous cognitions, the form of the word (*sphoṭa*) in a very clear manner.

The *sphoṭa* is a unity which already exists in the mind of the speaker and he utters the sounds in order to manifest it. His efforts to utter the sounds differ according to the *sphoṭa* which he wants to manifest and the sounds of the vocal organs may be the same. The effort to manifest *nadī* is different from the effort to manifest *dīna* and so the '*na*' in *nadī* is different from the '*na*' in *dīna.* So the *sphoṭa* manifested by them would be different and so the meaning conveyed by them would be different too. In the process described above, mention was made of impression or residual trace of the cognition of the sound. It is the usual kind of impression which, when awakened, causes the remembrance of the cognition which originally caused it. Each sound manifests the whole *sphoṭa* though vaguely and the impression has whole *sphoṭa* as its object. When awakened, it causes the remembrance of the whole *sphoṭa* the cognition of which becomes very clear at the time of the last sound because of the co-operation of the previous impressions which have the same indivisible *spdoṭa* as the object. The early vague cognitions of *sphoṭa,* their residual traces, and the cognition of the last sound have the same object, namely, the *sphoṭa.* What Bhartṛhari means by early vague cognitions is not made clear in our texts but perhaps he had something like Śeṣakṛṣṇa's idea of it. This comparatively late writer explains it in his *Sphoṭatattvanirūpaṇa* as follows : when somebody wants to say *kamala* he has already said it vaguely as soon as he has finished uttering *ka,* because all words not beginning with *ka* are now excluded and the word in question has to be one beginning with *ka.* As soon as he has uttered the second syllable *ma,* the field is further narrowed down. The word has to be one beginning with *kama,* but the cognition is still a little vague, because there are still several possibilities. It is only when the last syllable *la* is uttered that the word is grasped in all its clarity.

Another point in the doctrine is that even though each sound causes the cognition of the whole *sphoṭa* which is thus its object, it has the form of the sound with all its properties such as accent, duration, timbre and so on. Whenever a cognition has one thing as its object and the form of another, it is an error. When we mistake a rope for a snake in the dark, the rope is the object of our error because, after all, it is the rope which is in contact with the sense of vision and not the snake. Similarly, the *sphoṭa* is the object of the cognition of each sound, but it appears as the sound. In other words, when we finally get a clear cognition of the *sphoṭa* it is through a series of errors that we come to it. Bhartṛhari here gives an analogy : from a distance one mistakes a tree for an elephant. Later careful observation reveals the truth. We have come to the truth through an error. The sense is in contact with the tree and not with the elephant. The error has tree as its object and the form of an elephant. When in the final correct cognition, the object and the form are the same, the previous error has played a part in it. It is error which has led to the truth. Similarly, it is through a series of errors, consisting in cognising the *sphoṭa* in the form of sounds, that we finally grasp it in the form of the *sphoṭa* itself. When the *sphoṭa* in the form of sentence is being manifested by the sounds, there is, at first, a cognition of parts in the form of phonemes and individual words.[20]

This error has some features which have to be kept in mind. Not only does the *sphoṭa* appear as the sounds or phonemes, but the latter appear as parts of the indivisible *sphoṭa*. How it happens may be stated briefly as follows :— The effort to utter the phoneme *g* by itself is different from the effort to utter *g* in the word *gauḥ* and both are different from the effort to utter the phoneme *g* in the sentence *gām ānaya*. As the efforts are different, the resulting sounds are also different. But they are looked upon, wrongly of course, as the same. They are wrongly identi-

20. यथैव दर्शनैः पूर्वैर्दूरात् सन्तमसेऽपि वा ।
अन्यथाकृत्य विषयमन्यथैवाध्यवस्यति ॥ *Vāk.* I. 89.

fied because of the resemblance in the contacts and separations of the vocal organs necessary for producing these sounds. Being wrongly identified, their powers are confused. The sounds meant to manifest the *sphoṭa-s* of the phonemes, words and sentences differ from one another in their causes and effects. Their causes are different because they are the results of different intentions and efforts. Their efforts are different because they manifest different *sphoṭas*. As their effects are different, they are themselves different from one another, but they are wrongly identified. Their difference is not perceived. This failure to perceive the difference has two analogies, according to the *Vṛtti*. The shape of a cow is fit to manifest the universal called *gotva* and that of a gayal is fit to manifest the universal called *gavayatva*, but this difference is not perceived and so one sees resemblance between the two. Similarly, the moments of the action of turning are different from those of the action of pouring out. The former are the substrata of the universal called turning and the latter of the universal called pouring out; but this difference is not perceived and so one sees resemblance between the two series of moments. In the same way, one sees resemblance between the sounds which are really different from one another, both in their causes and their effects. So one confuses them and mixes them up. The confusion takes the following forms :– Because one sees resemblance between the sound *g* meant to manifest the word *gauḥ* and the one meant to manifest the phoneme *g* one thinks that the phoneme *g* is also manifested when the word *gauḥ* is manifested. One looks upon the phoneme *g* as part of the word *gauḥ*. Similarly, because one sees resemblance between the sound *g* meant to manifest the word *gauḥ* and the sound *g* meant to manifest the sentence *gām ānaya*, one thinks that the word *go* is a part of, a division within, the sentence *gām ānaya*. One looks upon the sounds meant to manifest the sentence as manifesting the word and the phoneme also as its parts and that the sentence is nothing more than a collection of the parts. If, for the manifestation of two indivisible *sphoṭas* one has to make similar movements of the vocal organs, the sounds or phonemes produced by these movements appear to be parts of both of these indivisible

sphoṭas. Because of this confusion, one thinks that the *sphoṭas* in the form of the sentence, word or the phoneme have parts whereas they have none.[21]

Not only do the many appear to be parts of the partless *sphoṭa*, but the latter appears to have the properties of the former. It is the manifesting sounds which can be short or long, but the *sphoṭa* appears to be so. The *sphoṭa* is One but it appears to be many in the form of the manifesting sounds. Here the analogy of the reflection is brought in. The *sphoṭa* appears to have the properties of the manifesting sounds, just as a reflection appears to have the properties of the medium of reflection. Several views were current about the nature of reflection :— (i) In the presence of the original a luminous surface like that of water is affected and seems to reflect the original but it is only a change in the water. There is no reflection apart from the water. (ii) The reflection exists in the water apart from it and has the original as its material cause. (iii) The rays of the sun, turned back by luminous surfaces like that of water, mirror etc. see the original and that seeing is the reflection. According to the first view (*tattvapakṣa*), the reflection appears to be in the water and to have movements; but it is only the water which one sees in that condition. In the second and the third views (*anyatvapakṣa*) the reflection is something different from the water. There is no contact between the wind and the reflection and so there cannot be any movement in the reflection itself. Because the reflection is in contact with water and the latter with the wind, the movement in the water appears to exist in the reflection. According

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21. प्रत्येकं व्यञ्जका भिन्ना वर्णवाक्यपदेषु ये ।
तेषामत्यन्तभेदेऽपि संकीर्णा इव शक्तयः ॥ *Vāk*. I. 88.

वर्णपदवाक्यविषया हि विशिष्टाः प्रयत्नास्तत्प्रेरिताश्च वायवः स्थानान्यभिघ्नन्ति । स्थानाभिघातप्राप्तसंस्काराश्च ध्वनयो यद्यपि परस्परव्यावृत्तस्वभावास्तथापि गोगवयजात्युपव्यञ्जनवद् भ्रमणरेचनादिकर्मसामान्यविशेषाश्रयवच्च तेषामुपव्यञ्जनानां दुर्ज्ञानो भेदः । सामान्यमात्रया कयाचिदनुगतः प्रविभक्तकार्याणामपि शक्तीनामात्मा कुतश्चित् कार्यविशेषात् संकरेणैवावस्थितः । ततश्चायं निरवयवेषु वर्णेषु मात्राविभागाध्यवसायः पदेषु च वर्णविभागाध्यवसायः वाक्येषु च पदविभागाध्यवसाय इति । *Vāk*. I. 88, and *Vṛtti* on it.

to all the three views, the reflection by itself is without any movement, but appears to have it because of the water. Similarly, the *sphoṭa* appears to be short, long or protracted, because the primary sounds (*prākṛtadhvani* to be explained soon) which manifest it are short, long, or protracted; or it appears to be of quick, medium or slow speed because the secondary sounds (*vaikṛtadhvani*, to be explained soon) are such.[22]

The invariable perception of the many before the perception of the one indivisible word is an error which differs from other errors. This error ultimately leads to the perception of the truth and so it becomes the path leading to it. Its occurrence is universal, its sequence is fixed. This is not the case with other errors. One may mistake a rope for a snake while another may mistake it for a little stream. Thus the form of the error may differ from person to person. Nor is there any fixity in the order of the error. Sometimes one mistakes a rope for a snake at first and later for a little stream of water. At other times, it may take place in the opposite order. In the case of the *sphoṭa* appearing as the sounds, the error takes place inevitably, it is a universal error. The indivisible *sphoṭa* of *gauḥ* appears as *g*, *au* and *ḥ* for everybody and it appears in the same order for everybody.

Why there is this peculiarity in this error is explained by Bhartṛhari by means of analogies. It was shown before that the cognition of the unreal sounds or phonemes as parts of the *sphoṭa* is a means to the comprehension of the latter which alone is real. The analogy of mistaking a tree from a distance for an elephant, as a step towards its correct cognition, has already been mentioned. Bhartṛhari gives another analogy based on Vaiśeṣika ideas. The cognition of the lower and irrelevant numbers is a means to the

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22. प्रतिबिम्बं यथान्यत्र स्थितं तोयक्रियावशात् ।
तत्प्रवृत्तिमिवान्वेति स धर्मः स्फोटनादयोः ॥ *Vāk.* I. 49, *Vāk.* I. p. 108, ll. 1–4, and *Vṛtti* on it.

तत्त्वपक्षेऽन्यत्वपक्षे वा चन्द्रादिप्रतिबिम्बं यत्राधारे संसृष्टमिवोपलभ्यते न हि तत्तथा। तत्तु निष्क्रियमपि तोयतरङ्गादिक्रियाधर्मोपग्रहेणैव तोयादीनां भिन्नां प्रवृत्तिमनुपतत्येव। प्राकृतस्य वैकृतस्य च नादस्य ह्रस्वदीर्घप्लुतेषु द्रुतमध्यमविलम्बितासु च वृत्तिषु तावानेव स्फोटो विचित्रां वृत्तिमनुविधत्ते ॥

cognition of the higher and relevant number, even though they are different in many respects. The Vaiśeṣikas believe that from duality onwards to the higher number, all numbers are produced by *apekṣābuddhi,* that is, the notion that relates to many unities before the next number is cognised. When two things are brought before us, we cognise each one separately as 'this is one' and 'that is one'. This is *apekṣābuddhi.* Then arises the notion of two. This is true of all subsequent numbers. Thus the previous numbers become the means for the production and cognition of the higher numbers, though only one of them is relevant on a particular occasion. Nor is there anything surprising in the fact that there is a fixity in the sequence in which the cognition of the *sphoṭa* takes place, namely, first the cognition of the sounds or phonemes as part of the *sphoṭa* takes place and then the compsehension of the *sphoṭa* itself. This fixity in the order of cognition is comparable to the fixity in the order of production of the effect in the phenomenal world as when milk turns into curds or the seed becomes sprout.[23] The two processes involve many intermediary stages, all of which take place in a fixed order.

The cardinal fact about the manifestation of the *sphoṭa* is that before it takes place one cognises certain elements which are unreal and appear to be parts of the *sphoṭa.* We ordinary mortals have no other way of comprehending it. We can do so only through the sounds which have differentiation and sequence and have not the same reality as the *sphoṭa.* We, who can learn it only through the teaching of others, suffer from a certain incapacity to perceive the *sphoṭa* directly.[24] We can do so only

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23. यथानुपूर्वीनियमो विकारे क्षीरबीजयोः ।
तथैव प्रतिपत्तॄणां नियतो बुद्धिषु क्रमः ॥ *Vāk.* I. 91.
तथैषामर्वाग्दर्शनानां प्रतिपत्तॄणां वाक्यस्वरूपग्रहणपूर्वकेण वाक्यार्थग्रहणेन प्रधानेन प्रयुक्तानां नियतोपाये साध्ये तस्मिन्नर्थे नियतक्रमपरिणामभागाकारप्रत्यवभासमात्रायुक्ता बुद्धयः प्रवर्तन्ते स्फोटेषु । *Vāk.* I.

24. असतश्चान्तराले याञ्छब्दानस्तीति मन्यते ।
प्रतिपत्तुरशक्तिः सा ग्रहणोपाय एव सः ॥ *Vāk.* I. 85.

(*Continued on the next page*)

through the differentiated word-elements. That is why all of us are subject to the same error. As this error is a means to the ultimate correct cognition, it must necessarily precede it. The particular order in which the errors follow one another is a means to the final correct cognition of the *sphoṭa.* Therefore, there is a fixity in the order of the error of the error too. It is only when the one indivisible *sphoṭa* assumes unreal differentiation that it comes within the range of worldly usage. In this respect, it is very much like consciousness itself. Consciousness is really one, but it becomes differentiated when it illuminates the different objects of the world. It seems to take on the form of the different objects which it reveals. It is only when it does so that it enters into worldly usage. Similarly, as long as the word is only within us, One and undifferentiated, it cannot enter into verbal usage. Even though it is the unified word which is eternally associated with the meaning, it has to be manifested by the differentiated sounds before it can convey it. Thus Consciousness and the word have to go through an unreal differentiation before they can play their part in the world. In fact, mind and the word are only two aspects which the *śabdatattva* (Word-Principle) within us assumes when it evolves.[25]

While all this is true of us ordinary mortals, the great sages are credited with the power of cognizing the indivisible *sphoṭa* directly, without going through the process of errors. Not only do they cognize it themselves, they also impart it to others. That is what Yāska has stated in his *Nirukta*, I. 20. Bhartṛhari mentions some details as to how the sounds manifest the *sphoṭa*. In order to do it, do they bring about in the sense of hearing, or in the word

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(Continued from the last page)

सा खलु परप्रदर्शितविषयग्राहिणामशक्तिः प्रतिपत्तृणाम् ॥

Vāk. I. p. 152, l. 1.

25. (अ) भेदानुकारो ज्ञानस्य वाचश्चोपप्लवो ध्रुवः ।
क्रमोपसृष्टरूपा वाग्ज्ञानं ज्ञेयव्यपाश्रयम् ॥ *Vāk.* I. 86.

(ब) तेन चान्यभेदरूपोपग्रहेणोपप्लुतं शब्दतत्त्वमेवेदं वाङ्मनसाख्यमविभाग-
मन्यथा प्रतीयत इति । *Vāk.* I. p. 152 l. 8.

(*sphoṭa*) itself, a fitness (*saṁskāra*) which they did not have before? There were apparently three views on the subject:—(i) The sounds bring about in the sense of hearing a fitness which was not there before. (ii) They produce a fitness in the word (*sphoṭa*) itself. (iii) They bring about a fitness in both.[26]

It is the word *indriya* which is used in this context and the *Vṛtti* elaborates the idea by bringing in the words *śrotra, ghrāṇa, cakṣu.* The process of the perfection of the sense is not peculiar to the perception of the word. In the perception of the other objects of the world also, sometimes the sense has to be made fit to do its work. The application of ointment to the eye enables one to see better. Even more important is attention and concentration without which one may not see at all. Attention makes a difference to the sense of hearing, but none to the object itself. An example of the object being previously made fit to be perceived is the smell of the earth. It is only when the heated earth is sprinkled with water that its smell is perceived. The sprinkling gives the smell a certain fitness to be experienced. Similarly, exposure of medicated oil to the sun brings *saṁskāra* to it. Its smell now becomes fit to be perceived. In these cases, the sense is not affected.[27] The act of seeing an object was looked upon by some people as an example of the perfection of both the sense and the object. They held the view that the sense of vision consists of rays of light and that it reaches out to the object at the time of visual perception (*prāpyakāri*). While reaching out, it gets mixed up with the all-pervading atoms of light outside. This is a kind of perfection of the sense of vision. At that moment,

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26. इन्द्रियस्यैव संस्कारः शब्दस्यैवोभयस्य वा ।
क्रियते ध्वनिभिर्वादास्त्रयोऽभिव्यक्तिवादिनाम् ॥ *Vāk.* I. 78.

तत्र केचिन्मन्यन्ते ध्वनिरुत्पद्यमानः श्रोत्रं संस्करोति । तच्च संस्क्रियमाणं शब्दोपलब्धौ द्वारतां प्रतिपद्यते । अन्ये त्वभिव्यक्तिवादिनो मन्यन्ते शब्द एव ध्वनिसंसर्गात् प्राप्तसंस्कारः श्रोत्रस्य विषयत्वमुपगच्छति । केषांचिद् ध्वनिरुभयोः शब्दश्रोत्रयोरनुग्रहे वर्तते । *Vāk.* I. p. 145, ll. 2–5.

27. 'विषयसंस्कारस्तु तैलादीनामातपादिभिः पृथिव्याश्चोदकेन गन्धप्रतिपत्तिकाले दृष्टो न घ्राणेन्द्रियस्य । *Vāk.* I. p. 146, ll. 1–2.

the object is also illuminated, that is, made fit, by the external light, to be perceived. Thus perfection comes both to the sense and to the object. Bhartṛhari seems to go by this analogy and to have a preference for the view that both the sense (*śrotra*) and the object are perfected by the manifested sounds. They make the ear fit to perceive the word and the word itself fit to be perceived.[28]

Coming to the process of manifestation itself, Bhartṛhari likens it to the process by which action or movement is manifested or cognised. Our perception of movement takes place as follows :– A movement like lifting the hand (*utkṣepaṇa*) consists of a series of moments. Each moment consists in coming into contact with a point of space and then disappearing. It is replaced by the next moment which does the same. As these moments are transitory, they cannot co-exist; and cannot therefore form a whole of which they would be parts, and in which the universal of the movement of lifting the hand would inhere. Such a universal, different from the wider universal of movement in general, is accepted and if it does exist, it would inhere in each moment of lifting. Even though it inheres in each moment it is not capable of being cognized because of too much resemblance between the moments of lifting and those of the moments of other movements like turning the hand. There is not yet enough ground for eliminating other movements. The moments of each movement are the result of a special effort to make that movement and they are the substrata of the universal of that movement. But that universal cannot be cognised until a series of moments has been cognized. It is not enough to cognize one or two moments. The universal really inheres in each moment and it is also cognized. But the cognition is too vague and unnamable. After a series of moments is

28. चक्षुषः प्राप्यकारित्वे तेजसा तु द्वयोरपि ।
विषयेन्द्रिययोरिष्टः संस्कारः स क्रमो ध्वनेः ॥

इहालोकानुगृहीतं घटादिविषयं सन्तमसेऽवस्थितोऽयं प्रतिपद्यते । तत्र येषामप्राप्यकारि चक्षुस्तेषामालोकेन विषयः प्रायेणानुगृह्यते । प्राप्यकारित्वे तु चक्षुषस्तुल्यजातीयेन तेजसा नयनरश्म्यनुग्रहः क्रियते । *Vāk.* I. 80, and *Vṛtti* on it.

cognized the direction of the moments becomes clear and so the cognition of the universal, inherent in each moment, also becomes clear. In other words, it now becomes possible to identify the movement. This is similar to the perception of the words (*sphoṭa-s*). They are also manifested by special efforts. The effort to utter the word *gamana*, for instance, is different from the effort to utter the word *gagana*. So the two *g* sounds produced by the two different efforts are different though they resemble each other because of the resemblance in the movements of the vocal organs. But this difference is not perceived. In other words, one does not clearly perceive whether it is the word *gamana* or the word *gagana* which is being uttered. But when all the manifesting sounds have been uttered, and heard in a series, then the universal of the word *gamana* is clearly perceived and verbal usage based on it becomes possible.[29] This mode of cognition of the word-universal is different from that of other universals accepted in other Śāstras. The cognition of the universal *gotva* (the fact of being a ' cow '), takes place when one sees the individual cow. The individual cow manifests *gotva* which is inherent in it. This is one kind of manifestation and cognition. When a lamp illuminates an object, it does not manifest an object inherent in it. That is another kind of manifestation and cognition. When, after perceiving the different moments of the movement of lifting the hand, moments which resemble one another, one perceives clearly the universal of the movement of lifting, it is another kind of manifestation and cognition. The manifestation of the universal of the word is like that of a movement like lifting the hand, but there is a difference. The manifesting sounds of a word like *gauḥ*

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29. यथाक्षेपविशेषेऽपि कर्मभेदो न गृह्यते ।
आवृत्तौ व्यज्यते जातिः कर्मभिर्भ्रमणादिभिः ॥
वर्णवाक्यपदेष्वेवं तुल्योपव्यञ्जना श्रुतिः ।
अत्यन्तभेदे तत्त्वस्य सरूपेव प्रतीयते ॥

आक्षेपविशेषाद्धि स्वजातिप्रयुक्ते भिन्नात्मनि प्रतिभेदं विनिविष्टस्वजातिविशेषेषे भ्रमणादौ कर्मणि कम्पनरेचनोत्क्षेपणादिभ्यो यो भेदः स न गृह्यते । आवृत्तौ तु दिग्विशेषावधिसंयोगविभागोपाधिकायामुपलब्धायामनुपलब्धपूर्वाऽव्यक्तोपलब्धा वा भ्रमणरेचनाख्या जातिरुपलब्धृणां स्वनिमित्तप्रत्ययहेतुः संपद्यते । *Vāk.* II. 20–21 with a part of the *Vṛtti.*

are different from one another. And yet after perceiving the different sounds of a word successively the universal of that word is clearly perceived. The successive sounds of a word make it fit to be perceived, but only as possessing their own properties such as duration, timbre, accent and so on. This last point requires elucidation and that can be done only by putting together Bhartṛhari's ideas on *dhvani* as distinct from the *sphoṭa*.

The *sphoṭa* to be manifested may be a phoneme, a word or a sentence, though in describing the process, Bhartṛhari had especially the sentence-*sphoṭa* in mind. The speaker wants to manifest, that is, to convey to the hearer, the *sphoṭa* which is within him, and for that purpose he has to produce the sounds by means of the vocal organs. His efforts to produce the sounds depend upon the *sphoṭa* which he wants to manifest. Only particular sounds uttered in a fixed order can manifest a given *sphoṭa*, whether it be that of a phoneme, a word or a sentence. Efforts differ with our desires to manifest particular *sphoṭa-s*, and sounds differ according to difference in efforts. The sounds have temporal distinctions, because they can be short, long, or protracted, following Vyāḍi, the author of the now lost *Saṅgraha* which is quoted in the *Vṛtti* on *Vāk*. I. 76. Bhartṛhari makes a distinction within the manifesting sounds. I refer to the distinction between primary sounds (*prākṛtadhvanis*) and secondary sounds (*vaikṛtadhvanis*).[30] The sounds are, after all, uttered to manifest the *sphoṭa-s* which are, therefore, their root-cause (*prakṛti*). Hence, in their first moment, that is, at the time of the manifestation of the *sphoṭa*, they are called *prākṛtadhvani*. Those are so called without which the form of the *sphoṭa* would remain unmanifested and, therefore, unperceived.[31] Not only that. Even though the *sphoṭa*, being eternal, has no duration, it appears to have the duration of the primary sounds with which it is perceived as identical. It is the duration of the primary sounds

30. इह द्विविधो ध्वनिः, प्राकृतो वैकृतश्च । *Vāk*. I. p. 142, l. 1.

31. तत्र प्राकृतो नाम येन विना स्फोटरूपमनभिव्यक्तं न परिच्छिद्यते । *Vāk*. I. p. 142, ll. 1–2.

which determines that the *sphoṭa* which is manifested is that of '*a*' for example, and not of *ā*. As soon as we hear the primary sounds, we perceive the *sphoṭa*. But the perception of the *sphoṭa* does not cease at once. It lasts a little while more in quick speech, a little longer in speech of medium speed and longer still in slow speech. But this continuity of perception of the already manifested *sphoṭa* cannot be explained unless the manifesting sounds also continue in the succeeding moments. These sounds of the succeeding moments, having the same duration as the sounds of the first moments are called (*vaikṛtadhvanis*). They continue to manifest the *sphoṭa* already manifested by the primary sounds. To put it differently, the *sphoṭa* continues to be perceived again and again as long as the secondary sounds last. Those are called secondary sounds by which the *sphoṭa* already manifested is perceived again and again uninterruptedly for a longer period of time.[32] How much longer depends upon the speed of utterence (*vṛttibheda*). As soon as the lamp is lit, one perceives the object and if the light continues, one continues to perceive the object. The *sphoṭa* is perceived as identical with the manifesting primary sounds (though quite different from them) and as having their properties.[33] The secondary sounds, on the other hand, come after the *sphoṭa* is manifested and so their difference from the latter is clearly perceived and their properties are not wrongly attributed to the *sphoṭa*.[34] They are the cause of the repeated perception of the same *sphoṭa* for a little while. Thus a slow utterance of *a* means the perception of a series of *a*, that is, *a a a a*. The slow utterance of *ā* means the perception of a series of *ā*, that is, *ā*, *ā*, *ā*, *ā*, a slowly uttered *a* can never become *ā*, according to Bhartṛhari.

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32. वैकृतस्तु येनाभिव्यक्तं पुनः पुनरविच्छेदेन प्रचिततरकालमुपलभ्यते ।
Vāk. I. p. 142, ll. 2–3.

33. ध्वनिना तु संसृष्टं स्फोटस्य रूपमुपलभ्यते यस्मात् तस्माद् ध्वनेः स्थितिकालः स्फोटोपलब्धिरूपः परिवर्तते । *Vāk*. I. p. 141, ll. 2–3.

34. शब्दस्योर्ध्वमभिव्यक्तेर्वृत्तिभेदं तु वैकृताः ।
ध्वनयः समुपोहन्ते स्फोटात्मा तैर्न भिद्यते । *Vāk*. I. 77.

In his commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya* also, Bhartṛhari refers to this distinction between *prākṛtadhvani* and *vaikṛtadhvani*. There he puts it in this way :— Among the sounds which manifest the eternal word, some are primary and some secondary. That sound which is produced by the contacts of the vocal organs and that which is produced by such a sound, these two are primary. Through these two, distinction in vowels can be perceived. That sound which comes from another sound is called secondary because no distinction is perceived through it.[35] Though the distinction here between primary and secondary sounds is essentially the same as in the *Vākyapadīya*, still, it is somewhat obscure, because here two kinds of primary sounds are mentioned, of which the second kind is produced by the first in which case the distinction between the second kind of primary sound and the secondary sound is not clear, because both are produced by sounds.

Bhartṛhari again refers to the distinction between these two kinds of sounds in the *Kālasamuddeśa* of the third Kāṇḍa. As we have already seen, there he gives his views on Time. According to him, Time is the *svātantryaśakti* of Brahman and is responsible for the temporal sequence of the objects and processes of the phenomenal world. In the course of his exposition, there is a reference to a method of measuring time which consisted in allowing water collected in a vessel to escape through a hole or tube (*nālikā*) in drops. This is the method of measurement through flow of water (*salilasrutiḥ*). Apparently the time taken by the water to escape through the tube was taken as the standard of measurement for other actions in the world. Kaiyaṭa also refers to this method when he explains the word *tribhāgādhikāḥ* occurring in the *Mahābhāṣya* on P. I. 1. 70. He says that when one recites a stanza or a Vedic passage quickly, nine drops of water escape through the tube whereas when one recites the same

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35. तस्य नित्यस्य येऽभिव्यञ्जकास्ते च केचित् प्राकृताः केचिद् वैकृताः । यः करणसन्निपातादुत्पद्यते यश्च तस्मात् तौ प्राकृतौ । ताभ्यां विशेषोपलब्धिः । यस्तु ध्वनितो ध्वनिरुत्पद्यते स वैकृतः । ततो विशेषाभावात् । *MahāBhāDī.* (Poona), p. 49, ll. 3–5.

at medium speed, twelve drops of water escape through the tube. Nāgeśa, however, takes the word *nālikā* as standing for the *suṣumnā nāḍī* and therefore sees here no reference to a method of measuring time.

Keeping this particular conception of time and this particular way of measuring it in mind an effort is made to explain the distinction between short, long and protracted vowels which being *śabda* or *sphoṭa* are eternal and should not therefore admit of distinctions based on time. Some people apparently tried to explain the distinction away by saying that it was a mere assumption and gave another such assumption as an analogy. Our cognitions of two actions, one quickly done and the other slowly done, are of equal duration and yet because the two actions cognised are not of equal duration, the cognition also appears not to have equal duration. This is a wrong assumption on our part. Similarly difference of duration among vowels is a mere assumption, because vowels, being *sphoṭa*, are eternal and cannot admit of any distinction based on time. But this explanation is not satisfactory because if this distinction is mere assumption on our part, it cannot explain certain facts. The quantity of water which flows from the tube when a long vowel is repeatedly uttered is greater by one third than when a short vowel is repeatedly uttered and the quantity which escapes when a protracted vowel is repeatedly uttered is greater by one third than when a long vowel is repeatedly uttered. A mere assumption on our part cannot make any difference to the flow of water from the tube; and as there is a difference we have to accept that the difference of duration in the vowel is also real.[36]

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36. ह्रस्वदीर्घप्लुतावृत्त्या नालिकासलिलादिषु ।
कथं प्रचययोगः स्यात् कल्पनामात्रहेतुकः ।।

वास्तवे ह्रस्वादौ कालस्याभेदेऽपि चिरक्षिप्रज्ञानवदुपचरिते कालभेदे समाश्रीयमाणे ह्रस्वस्य पुनःपुनरुच्चारणे नालिकायाः पानीयस्रुतिरल्पा, ततस्त्रिभागाधिका दीर्घस्योच्चारणावृत्त्या, ततोऽपि प्लुतस्य त्रिभागाधिकेति योऽयं प्रकर्षसंबन्धः सलिलस्रुतेः स कथं कल्पनामात्रकृतकालभेदात् स्वतः कालविभागशून्याद् ह्रस्वादिभेदाद् भवेत् ।

Vāk. III. *KālaS.* 64, and *Vṛtti* on it.

It is to meet this difficulty that the distinction between *prākṛtadhvani* and *vaikṛtadhvani* is again brought in. It is pointed out that even though the word, in this case the vowel, is eternal it can be perceived only when it is manifested by the *dhvani-s* which are not eternal entities and, therefore, admit of distinction based on time. These sounds are susceptible to increase (*upacaya*) and decrease (*apacaya*), that is greater or lesser duration. They are heard as one with the phoneme (*varṇa*), which they manifest and therefore their properties are attributed to it. The phoneme cannot be cognised as apart from the vowels which manifest it. Therefore, the properties of the *vyañjaka-s* namely, the primary sounds, become so to speak part of the very nature of the phoneme which is manifested. As the primary sounds are susceptible to increase and decrease they can be short, long or protracted. Therefore, the phoneme is also perceived as short, long or protracted. This explains why when the phoneme is heard in its different lengths or duration, there is difference in the flow of water from the tube. The perception of the primary sounds with their particular duration is not a process external to the phoneme because the latter cannot be perceived apart from the former. Therefore, any distinction based on time which is found in the former is transferred to the latter and becomes effective. This explains why there is difference in the flow of water.[37] This also explains why there is no force in the flow analogy, mentioned before, of the two cognitions of two actions of unequal duration also appearing to be of unequal duration. It is pointed out that there is difference between the two cases. The relation between *dhvani* and *śabda* is not the same as the relation between a cognition and its object. The form of a cognition and that of its object are cognized as distinct from each other. But *dhvani* and *śabda* are perceived as one.[38] If a

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37. ततश्चाभिव्यञ्जकाधीनत्वाच्छब्दतत्त्वोपलम्भस्य यथाव्यञ्जकं तद्धर्मः स्वरूपनिवेश्येवेति भिद्यते नालिकासलिलस्रुतिः । *Vāk.* III. *KālaS.* p. 66, ll. 5-6.

38. न हि यथा ज्ञानस्य विषयस्तथा शब्दस्य ध्वनयः । विषयाकारस्य शताद्यात्मकस्य ज्ञानाकाराद् विवेकेन संवेदनाच्छब्दध्वनीनां चाविवेकात् ।

Vāk. III. *KālaS.* p. 66, ll. 18–19.

difference in *dhvani* did not affect the nature of the phoneme, the difference in the flow of water would be inexplicable. As it is, it does affect the nature of the phoneme. Therefore, the difference in the flow of water can be explained.

9. It is not merely such distinctions as short and long which are transferred from the manifesting sounds to the manifested *śabda* but other distinctions also. The fourth part of a *mātrā*, manifested by the least amount of *dhvani* and the collection of *ṛk* verses, comprising ten *maṇḍala-s*, and having sixty-four *adhyāya-s*, manifested by the maximum amount of sounds, do not differ in respect of time, both being eternal,[39] whatever difference there may be in their manifesting sounds. To explain this, an analogy is given. Just as the cognitions of an elephant and a mosquito are equal to each other as cognitions, and yet appear to differ from each other on account of the difference in the objects which figure in them, in the same way, the real word which is *sphoṭa* is the same whether in a word or a sentence and yet appears to be different in each case on account of the difference in the manifesting sounds.[40] Similarly, such distinctions as *anunāsika* and *ananunāsika*, *udātta* and *anudātta* really belong to the *dhvani-s* only, but are attributed to the word. These distinctions must be taken as belonging to the primary sounds. The secondary ones only cause difference in the speed of utterance. All the other distinctions in the phonemes, such as those of quantity, accent and timbre are supposed really to belong to the primary sounds; and therefore, to affect the cognition of the phonemes which are perceived as one with them.[41] The sounds, in the first moment of utterance,

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39. मात्रायाश्चतुर्थस्य भागस्यापचिततरध्वनिव्यङ्ग्यस्य दश अवयवा येषां ते दशतयाः समुदायाः ऋगात्मानः तेषां समूहस्य दाशतयस्य चतुःषष्ट्यात्मकस्य वेदराशेः प्रविततरध्वनिव्यङ्ग्यस्य कालपरिमाणभेदेन विशेषो नास्ति । *Vāk.* III. *KālaS.* p. 66, ll. 25 ff.

40. तद्यथा हस्तिमशकज्ञाने स्वरूपेणैकरूपेऽप्याकारोपप्लवाद् विलक्षणे इवानुभूयेते एवं शब्दात्मा स्फोटस्वभावः सर्वत्र पदवाक्यविषयेऽविलक्षणोऽभिव्यञ्जकभेदाद् विलक्षण इव चकास्ति । *Vāk.* III, *KālaS.* p. 67, ll. 2–4.

41. सर्वश्च ह्रस्वदीर्घानुनासिकत्वादिधर्मव्रातः शब्दात्मनि व्यञ्जकाधीन इति । *Vāk.* III. *KālaS.* p. 66, L. 11.

that is, the *prākṛtadhvani-s*, manifest the word. The sounds which follow in the succeeding moments are like echoes or reverberations (*anuraṇanarūpāḥ*) of these, of the cause of the repeated cognitions of the word, otherwise called speed of utterance. They are external to the word, and do not bring about any division or distinction with a it (i. e. original *sphoṭa*).[42]

(1) The *prākṛtadhvani-s* are produced by the contacts and separations of the articulatory organs before the manifestation of the *sphoṭa*. The *sphoṭa* is cognized (wrongly of course) as one with them. It cannot be otherwise. Hence distinctions of duration, pitch etc. in the *prākṛtadhvani-s* are attributed to the *sphoṭa* which is free from all such distinctions.

(2) The *vaikṛtadhvani-s* are the continuation, a kind of reverberation of the *prākṛtadhvani-s*; and they are produced ' after the manifestation of the *sphoṭa* ' = *śabdasyordhvam abhivyaktyeḥ*, as Bhartṛhari puts it (*Vāk*. I. 77), ' *anuraṇanarūpasya paścātkālabhāvinaḥ* ' as says Helārāja. That is why they cannot in any way affect the nature of the *sphoṭa*. They are responsible for the different speeds of utterance. The different speeds of utterance mean a greater or smaller number of repetitions of the perception of *sphoṭa*.

Even among those who held that the *dhvani-s* manifest the *sphoṭa*, there was difference of opinion on details as the *Vṛtti* points out :— (i) Some were of the opinion that the *dhvani-s* are perceived as identical with the *sphoṭa* and not as distinct from it. The process is similar to what happens when the red *japā* flower is placed next to a crystal. The crystal is perceived as red, the redness is not perceived apart from the crystal. According to the more orthodox view, it is the *sphoṭa* which is perceived as one with the *dhvani-s*, so that the properties of the latter are attributed

42. प्राकृतध्वनिभिरभिव्यक्ते शब्दतत्त्वेऽनुरणनरूपा ये पश्चात्कालभाविनो ध्वनयः सन्तानेन वर्तन्ते श्रोत्रान्तराल इव स्थिताः शीघ्रसन्तानवर्तनात् ते श्रोत्रप्रदेशमनुप्राप्ताः शब्दप्रचयग्रहणहेतुतां श्रोत्रगुणात् प्रतिपद्यमाना द्रुतादिवृत्तिभेदं रचयन्ति । ततश्च ते शब्दतत्त्वाद् बहिर्भूता न भिन्दन्ति तत् । *Vāk*. III. *KālaS*. p. 67, ll. 10–13.

to the former. (ii) Some others were of the view that the *dhvani-s*, without themselves being perceived, are the cause of the manifestation of the *sphoṭa*. Here the senses are brought in as analogy. The senses and their properties are not perceived when, through them, we perceive the objects. That is what happens when we perceive the *sphoṭa* through the sounds.[43] (iii) There was another set of people who believed that the perceptions of the *sphoṭa* and of the *dhvani-s* are quite distinct. Sometimes, especially from a distance, the sounds can be heard but the words cannot be identified.[44] It means that the *sphoṭa-s* are not perceived, even though the sounds are. Thus, the two cognitions are quite distinct. (iv) Ordinarily, the words *dhvani* and *nāda* are used as synonyms.[45] Sometimes, however, they seem to be distinguished, though the distinction is not presented as the normal view, but as that of some. It is said that according to some, the *sphoṭa* is manifested by the *nāda* which results from the *dhvani-s* produced by the contacts and separations of the vocal organs. This means that *nāda* is the product of *dhvani*. It is looked upon as a gross form or an accumulation of *dhvani-s*.

These views are only deviations in detail. But Bhartṛhari mentions another view of *sphoṭa* and *dhvani* quite different from his own and attributed to those who held the word to be transitory. As several Kārikās of the *Vākyapadīya* are devoted to the exposition of this view, it will not be out of place to say a few words about it here though the text is rather obscure in places. According to this view, the initial sounds which are produced by

43. केषांचित्तु यथेन्द्रियाणीन्द्रियगुणाश्चासंवेद्यरूपा एव विषयोपलब्धिहेतवस्तथायं ध्वनिरनुगृह्यमाणरूपः शब्दग्रहे निमित्तं भवति । *Vāk.* I. p. 147, ll. 4–6.

44. अन्ये त्वाहुः दृष्टा केवलस्य ध्वनेः स्फोटरूपानवधारणे दूरादुपलब्धिः ।
loc. cit. l. 6.

45. (अ) नित्यपक्षे तु संयोगजविभागजध्वनिव्यङ्ग्यः स्फोटः । एकेषां संयोगविभागजध्वनिसंभूतनादाभिव्यङ्ग्यः । *Vāk.* I. p. 168, ll. 3–4.

(ब) तच्च सूक्ष्मे व्यापिनि ध्वनौ करणव्यापारेण प्रचीयमाने स्थूलेनाभ्रसंघातवदुपलभ्येन नादात्मना प्राप्तविवर्तेन तद्विवर्तानुकारेणात्यन्तमविवर्तमानं विवर्तमानमिव गृह्यते । *Vāk.* I. p. 106, ll. 1–3.

the contacts and separations of the vocal organs are themselves the *sphoṭa-s* and not mere manifestors of the *sphoṭa-s*. As these initial sounds are momentary, the *sphoṭa* is also momentary according to this view. The sounds which are produced by these initial sounds and by themselves and, which spread in all directions in gradually decreasing strength and ultimately reach the ears of the hearers are the *dhvani-s*.[46] The *sphoṭa-s* belong to the first moment and are the result of the contacts and separations of the vocal organs, while those of the succeeding moments are called *śabdajāḥ śabdāḥ* = sounds produced by sounds. Whether they be the initial sounds or the subsequent ones, they are all transitory and last only for a few seconds. It is also clear that the subsequent ones are in the nature of a reverberation of the initial ones. The initial ones are the effects of the contacts and separations and the causes of the following ones. The reverberation is looked upon as a chain of repetitions of the initial sounds, a chain in which each following link is weaker than the preceding one, but is none the less a reflection of the initial *sphoṭa*. The chain can be shorter or longer but the initial *sphoṭa* and each link in the chain are looked upon as momentary. The reverberation of a drum lasts longer and reaches further than that of the noise of a piece of metal. It is the initial *sphoṭa* which brings about the chain and the shorter or longer duration of the chain is attributed to the initial sounds. The cognitions of an elephant and a mosquito are of equal duration, but the difference in the size of the objects is attributed to their cognitions. The fact that, according to this view, the initial sound produced by the contacts and separations of the vocal organs is called *sphoṭa* and

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46. यः संयोगविभागाभ्यां करणैरुपजन्यते ।
स स्फोटः शब्दजाः शब्दा ध्वनयोऽन्यैरुदाहृताः ॥

अनित्यपक्षे स्थानकरणप्राप्तिविभागहेतुकः प्रथमाभिनिर्वृत्तो यः शब्दः स स्फोट इत्युच्यते । तज्जातास्तु सर्वदिक्कास्तद्रूपप्रतिबिम्बोपग्राहिणः सर्वद्रव्याणां स्वेनात्मना निरवयवत्वाद् आकाशस्यापि मुख्यसमवायिदेशवत् संयोगिद्रव्यान्तरदेशप्रविभागोपचारे सति देशनैरन्तर्यप्रत्यासत्त्या कार्यकारणसन्तानविच्छेदेन यथोत्तरमपचीयमानपूर्वप्रतिबिम्बोपग्रहशक्तयो मन्दप्रदीपप्रकाशितरूपकल्पाः क्रमेण प्रध्वंसमाना ये वर्णश्रुतिं विभजन्ति ते ध्वनय इत्युच्यन्ते ।

Vāk. I. 102, and *Vṛtti* on ib.

the subsequent reverberation, the duration of which is variable, is called *dhvani* and also the fact that in explaining this view the *Vṛtti* brings in the analogy of the drum-beat naturally reminds one of the *Mahābhāṣya* on P. I. 1. 70 where the words *sphoṭa* and *dhvani* occur and the illustration of the drum-beat is used. Among those who hold the word to be transitory, some were of the opinion that the *sphoṭa* and the *dhvani* were produced at the same time. They bring in the analogy of the light and the flame of the lamp. The flame and the light are produced at the same time. The flame, however, does not extend far, does not occupy much space, whereas the light may spread far. From a distance, we may see the light but not the flame. In the same way, from a distance, we may hear the sound, but not the *sphoṭa*. But the two are quite distinct just as the initial sound of a bell and its reverberation are quite distinct from each other.[47]

Another view of *dhvani* is stated in the *Vākyapadīya* but it is not clear in which circles it was held, nor is it easy to get a clear idea of the view itself. The view appears to have been put forward as an answer to the question raised by some that, if the distinction between short, long and protracted and that between slow, medium and quick speeds of utterance are due to manifesting sounds, what is the difference between these two distinctions themselves. The meaning of the *Vṛtti* on *Vāk*. I. 105 and 106 is none too clear and the *Paddhati* on the *Vṛtti* of the later stanza is particularly silent about the meaning of certain expressions like *abhimarśin*, *anuprakāśa*, *nādāntarāla*, *anuṣaṅga*. The view, however, may be stated as follows though I wish I could make it clearer : It is not due to any difference in the volume of the manifesting sounds (*śabdānāṁ pracaya*) that the distinction between short, long and protracted is perceived in the *sphoṭa* of

47. दूरात् प्रभेव दीपस्य ध्वनिमात्रं तु लक्ष्यते ।
घण्टादीनां च शब्देषु व्यक्तो भेदः स दृश्यते ॥

इह केचिदाचार्या व्यक्तं स्फोटं सहजेन ध्वनिना सर्वतो दूरव्यापिना प्रकाशस्थानीयेन गन्धेन युक्तं द्रव्यविशेषमिवाविर्भावकाल एव संबद्धं मन्यन्ते ध्वनिना ।

Vāk. I. 104, and *Vṛtti* on it.

the vowel phonemes but to the greater or lesser intensity of the contacts of the vocal organs at the time of utterance (*dravyābhighātapracaya*).[48] The contacts cause a vibration (*kampa*) and the vowels are perceived as short or long according to the intensity of the vibration. The sounds produced while the vibration lasts determine whether the vowel is short or long. The intensity belongs to the contacts or to the resulting vibration, but it is attributed to the *sphoṭa*. When the vibration ceases, the reverberation of the sounds produced by it continues and it is the duration of the reverberation called *nādajā nādāḥ* in the *Vṛtti* which determines whether the speed of the utterance is slow, quick or medium. The above is a gist of the meaning of *Vāk*. I. 105, together with the *Vṛtti*. The point to note here is that the distinction between short, long and protracted vowels is attributed to the relative intensity of the contacts of the organs of articulation, resulting in the intensity of the vibration. In the view of Bhartṛhari himself described earlier, the distinction was attributed to the volume (*pracaya*) of the *prākṛtadhvani-s* themselves and left at that. The next stanza is intended to explain the same point further. Even when the vibration ceases, the sounds are produced from the *sphoṭa* itself as one flame is produced from another.[49] It is this statement which makes one think that the view was of those who held the word to be transitory. It is they who held that the first sound produced by the contacts and separation of the vocal organs was the *sphoṭa* and the subsequent ones produced by the *sphoṭa* were the *dhvani-s*. The *sphoṭa* is produced by the contacts and while the vibration lasts. The subsequent ones are called *anuprakāśa* or *anuṣaṅga* because they follow the initial *sphoṭa*. We saw that Helārāja used the word *anuraṇana* to designate the secondary sounds in Bhartṛhari's own view. The *Vṛtti* uses the words *anuprakāśa* and *anuṣaṅga* in this context;

48. अनित्यपक्षेऽपि नैव शब्दानां प्रचये दीर्घप्लुतौ प्रचीयेते । किं तर्हि द्रव्याभिघात-प्रचयादेव । *Vāk*. I. p. 171, ll. 7-8.

49. अनवस्थितकम्पेऽपि करणे ध्वनयोऽपरे ।
स्फोटादेवोपजायन्ते ज्वाला ज्वालान्तरादिव ॥ *Vāk*. I. 106.

but what it says about them is by no means clear. All that is clear is so because of the analogy of the flame – that these subsequent sounds are a kind of continuation or reverberation of the *sphoṭa*.

After this digression to describe the views of others including those who looked upon the *sphoṭa* as something transitory (*anitya*) it remains to conclude this brief exposition of Bhartṛhari's own doctrine. As pointed out before, the *sphoṭa* is at first cognized erroneously in the form of sounds and correctly cognized only in the end. In other words, the initial error is set aside as often happens in the case of other errors. Ordinarily, an error is set aside in a negative way. If the rope was unmistaken for a snake, the error is set aside when we say: No, this is not a snake. This is a negative way of setting aside an error. But it can also take a positive form as in the case of the erroneous cognition of the *sphoṭa* as the sounds. We do not say in the end. No, this is not *g*, *au*, *ḥ*; we say instead : here is the word *gauḥ*. This is the positive way of setting aside an error.

Then after a series of erroneous cognitions having the form of sounds, accompained by a vague but progressively clear cognition of the *sphoṭa*, there is finally a clear cognition of it. Bhartṛhari describes this final clear cognition as a case of perception. It is not that one infers its existense from the previous vague cognitions. The latter lead to a clear perception of it. The previous cognitions also had the *sphoṭa* as their object but the cognition of it was vague and that is why they had the form of sounds. When the comprehension of the *sphoṭa* itself is vague, it is natural that it should have the form of the sounds. It is a natural corollary of it. But when the final cognition reveals the *sphoṭa* in all its clarity and distinctness, it has no longer the form of the sounds. The error has given place to truth. Such a cognition can only be perception. The object and the form of cognition are now identical. Another proof that the cognition of the *sphoṭa* is a case of perception is that it is only perception which can reveal an object, at first vaguely and later clearly. When from a distance a tree is vaguely cognised the cognition

may take the form of an elephant. When, finally, it is recognised to be a tree, the cognition is a clear case of perception. When the expert jeweller finally sees the genuineness of a precious stone after a continuous gaze at it consisting of a series of comparatively vague cognitions of it, it is a case of perception. The other means of knowledge, like inference either reveal the object or do not reveal it at all. It is only perception which can reveal it at first vaguely and finally clearly. That is why the Naiyāyikas and others recognise the distinction between *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka* within perception only and not within the other forms of valid knowledge.

In Bhartṛhari's doctrine of *sphoṭa* as described in the foregoing pages, the following, among other things, have been distinguished :—

1. The Brahman-Śabdatattva and the whole cosmos which emanates from it.

2. The Self within everybody which is a spark of the Brahman-Śabdatattva, and the *śabda* and the *artha* which exist in it in an undifferentiated state as one with it.

3. The integrated *śabda* and the integrated *artha* differentiated in the *buddhi* of the speaker and standing towards each other as *prakāśaka* and *prakāśya*, as *kāraṇa* and *kārya*.

4. The manifestation of the integrated *śabda* by the sounds uttered by the speaker at the level of the *prāṇa*, and the organs of articulation.

5. The listener's hearing of the sounds as uttered by the speaker and his comprehension of the integrated *śabda* and that of the integrated meaning from it.

Of these different things which have been distinguished, what is Bhartṛhari's *sphoṭa* ? This word has had a great fortune and it has been appropriated by various systems of thought. But the word does not always stand for the same thing in all of them. Even Bhartṛhari refers to some thinkers who looked upon it

differently from himself; and their view has been described briefly above. Later grammarians like Nāgoji Bhaṭṭa, though professedly followers of Bhartṛhari, understood it in their own way. Some have used the word for the ultimate Reality itself conceived of as Consciousness. Others have used it for the undifferentiated word and meaning one with the *śabdatattva*. Others still have used it for the *śabda* and *artha* together, but differentiated in the *buddhi*. Some other scholars reserve the word for the integrated *śabda* as understood by the listener after hearing the sounds uttered by the speaker. What we have to understand is how Bhartṛhari himself looked upon it.

He describes the ultimate Reality, as Brahman, as *śabdatattva*, as we have already seen. He also uses the word *śabdatattva* when he refers to that principle in everybody which is manifested by the sounds. We have seen that it is the *sphoṭa* which is manifested by the sounds. This means that the *śabdatattva* within is the *sphoṭa*. This inner principle which is manifested by the sounds is the integrated word, the expressive element (*vācaka*, *prakāśaka*); and as it is eternally associated with the integrated meaning, the two may be taken together. That would mean that the integrated word and the integrated meaning, differentiated in the mind and facing each other, rather the two sides of the same coin, constitute the *sphoṭa*. From some passages, however, one gets the impression that the word stands only for the integrated word differentiated in the mind, that is for the expressive symbol only. While describing the process of its manifestation, Bhartṛhari emphasizes that when manifested by the sounds, it is grasped by the mind, giving us to understand that it is only in the *buddhi* stage that the word can be called *sphoṭa*. In the pre-*buddhi* stage, it is the word *śabdatattva* which is used.

In the foregoing account of the doctrine of *sphoṭa* I have not taken into account the polemics which have raged between the grammarians and the opponents of *sphoṭa*, like the Mīmāṁsakas, the Naiyāyikas and the Vedāntins. It is because Bhartṛhari has not followed that method in the *Vākyapadīya*. He has not

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presented the arguments of the opponents of *sphoṭa* as a *pūrvapakṣa* to be answered one by one before the approved doctrine (*siddhānta*) is established. He has stated what he had to say about the *sphoṭa* in direct statements, but not in a reference to *utpattivādinaḥ* (= those who held that the word is produced and therefore transitory and not eternal as the grammarians hold) and to the *anityapakṣa*. But even there, the arguments of these opponents are not presented systematically for the purpose of refutation. As I have pointed out in a previous section, there is a spirit of accommodation in the *Vākyapadīya* which prevented the adoption of a polemical style. Another probable reason for the absence of such a style may be that the controversy on *sphoṭa*, started only after the work of Bhartṛhari had come to light. As far as we know, this is the earliest work in which the *sphoṭa* doctrine of the grammarians is officially expounded. The name and the fame of Bhartṛhari called forth opponents of equal calibre; Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Vācaspati Miśra, for instance. And also supporters of great eminence : Maṇḍana Miśra, for instance. The polemical spirit is greatly in evidence in the works of these later writers. I have given a glimpse of this polemical style in my article entitled 'The Doctrine of *Sphoṭa*' based on *Sphoṭasiddhi* of Maṇḍana Miśra[50]. Here I have given an account of the doctrine on the basis of the non-polemical text of Bhartṛhari and his early commentators.

50. See : 'The Doctrine of *Sphoṭa*', *Journal of the Ganganath Jha Research Institute*, Vol. 5, pt. 2, pp. 121 ff.

LECTURE III

THE *VĀKYAPADĪYA* AND THE *PRAMĀṆAS*

1. It is quite possible that Bhartṛhari may have intended to convey some correspondence of the three Kāṇḍas of the *Vākyapadīya,* dealing respectively with the Śabdatattva, Vākya, and Pada, to the three stages through which Vāk passes, namely, *paśyantī, madhyamā* and *vaikharī*. Helārāja definitely associates the third Kāṇḍa with the Vaikharī or *tṛtīyā vāgavasthā.*

From another point of view, one might say that when one analyses the *Vākyapadīya*, one finds that there are three kinds of notions underlying the work. We have, first of all, one set of notions analysed by Sanskrit Grammar in order to explain the forms of the Sanskrit language. They are, therefore, related to the Sanskrit language. Then you have another set of notions which are of a more general nature, notions which may be applicable not only to Sanskrit, but to language in general. I want to put for example, the doctrine of *sphoṭa*, and everything about the nature of the Word under such notions. It is a dynamic entity possessed of infinite powers. Due to these powers it manifests itself as the phenomenal world, as the cosmos consisting of the infinite number of experiencers, the infinite number of objects of experience, and of actions and processes which are accomplished, the different kinds of cognitions and experiences which take place. All these are manifestations of one ultimate reality. Not merely knowledge and experience, but the very purpose for which they take place, is also part of the manifestation. The ultimate Reality is One, and the manifestations are many; but the One manifests itself as many without losing its unity. The distinctive feature of Bhartṛhari's thought is that he calls the ultimate Reality *śabdatattva* (the Word-Principle). Some Sruti texts are given as authority for this. Some arguments are also given in the earliest commentary which we have, as to why the ultimate Reality is *śabdatattva.* It is an oft-repeated

point in Indian Philosophy that the original cause persists in all its products. We find that all the manifestations of Brahman are intertwined with the word; and so it is concluded that their root cause, Brahman, must be of the nature of the word. The objects, which figure in our knowledge caused by words, are derived from the word. Cognitions, in which objects figure, are formulated in words. We can state the form of knowledge only in words. As objects figure in the cognition produced by words, and as cognitions in which objects figure are formulated in words, we cannot cognize an object through the word without cognizing the word first, unlike *indriya.* Our verbal cognitions take the form of identity between the word and the object. Knowledge cannot illuminate unless it is intertwined with the word. (See *Vāk.* I. 116). Some objects like *alātacakra, śaśaviṣāṇa, vidhi, niṣedha* are mere transformations of the word. But I will leave aside such questions for the present; and just take one aspect of the manifestation : knowledge and experience, *darśana* and *bhoga.* It would be worth one's while to see what more Bhartṛhari says about it. In a regular *dārśanika* work, there would be discussions about valid and invalid knowledge, *pramā* and *bhrama.* But the *Vākyapadīya* is not a *dārśanika* work. After all, it is the work of a grammarian; and although it does set forth a *darśana* as the view relating to the nature of the ultimate Reality and its manifestation just referred to, it shows that Bhartṛhari is chiefly concerned with establishing the authority of Grammar. It can be authority only if it gives valid knowledge about something; and it is in this connection that Bhartṛhari is led to make some observations on valid knowledge, and how it arises. We ordinarily acquire knowledge when our senses come into contact with the external world. This is perceptive knowledge. Naturally each knowledge would relate to objects which are present at the time of sense contact. But in everyday life, we also acquire knowledge of objects with which our senses are not in contact at that time. Even when we do not see fire, we infer its presence when we see smoke. This is inference, which is only one way of knowing something about an object with which our senses are

not in contact. Another way is through words. When a reliable person tells us about an event which he saw and we did not, we get a knowledge of that event through his words. It is by making use of these three means of knowledge that we get on in this world. Bhartṛhari does not deny that these methods are capable of giving us valid knowledge of objects and events. But he knew the limitations of all of them. In a context where the question is: what is the nature of the meaning which we understand from words, he makes certain observations bracketing together perceptive knowledge and knowledge, acquired through words; and points out that both are variable and unreliable.[1] What one understands from other people's words or when observing objects and events is very much coloured by one's own background.[2] It may be sensibly different from what the speaker intended. Different persons get different perceptions while looking at the same thing; or the same person may get different perceptions while looking at the same thing at different times.[3] Perceptual errors are quite common. The sky looks like a surface and the fire-fly looks like light, but we all know that it is all wrong.[4] The fact is that we, ordinary mortals, cannot see the true nature of things and our perceptions and words are full of pitfalls.[5] It is true that the Ṛṣi-s are in a different position; their perception is based on the true nature of things; but that cannot be formulated in words. It is not of much use in worldly transactions.[6] In ordinary life sages are like

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1. यथेन्द्रियं सन्निपतद्वैचित्र्येणोपदर्शकम् ।
तथैव शब्दार्थस्य प्रतिपत्तिरनेकधा ॥ *Vāk.* II. 134.
2. वक्त्रान्यथैव प्रक्रान्तो भिन्नेषु प्रतिपत्तृषु ।
स्वप्रत्ययानुकारेण शब्दार्थः प्रविभज्यते । *Vāk.* II. 135.
3. एकस्मिन्नपि दृश्येऽर्थे दर्शनं भिद्यते पृथक् ।
कालान्तरेण चैकोऽपि तं पश्यत्यन्यथा पुनः ॥ *Vāk.* II. 136.
4. तलवद् दृश्यते व्योम खद्योतो हव्यवाडिव ।
नैव चास्ति तलं व्योम्नि न खद्योते हुताशनः ॥ *Vāk.* II. 140.
5. तस्माददृष्टतत्त्वानां सापराधं बहुच्छलम् ।
दर्शनं वचनं चापि नित्यमेवानवस्थितम् ॥ *Vāk.* II. 138.
6. ऋषीणां दर्शनं यच्च तत्त्वे किंचिदवस्थितम् ।
न तेन व्यवहारोऽस्ति न तच्छब्दनिबन्धनम् ॥ *Vāk.* II. 139.

ordinary people. They see things like ordinary people and use words like them.

Anumāna is useful as an aid to perception, which cannot reveal the whole object. It has to be used in order to determine the meaning of words. There are examples of this in Mīmāṁsā and Vyākaraṇa. Those, who cannot understand the meaning of the words of the *āgama* by merely hearing them, have to make use of reasoning to determine the meaning. To them, reasoning is a kind of eye. *Anumāna* is not reliable even in regard to things and actions having visible results, what to say of things and actions having invisible results ?

If knowledge obtained by the contact of the senses with the outside world is variable and unreliable, is there any other kind of knowledge which is reliable ? According to Bhartṛhari, there is. Another kind of knowledge is taking place all the time in us; and it is rooted in ourselves. When we see things or hear words, it is also working. It is a kind of flash of understanding, not only of the data presented to us by the senses, but also of what to do in a certain situation. It is the capacity to take in a situation and act suitably. Bhartṛhari points out that all living beings, from the highest to the lowest, have it, including animals and birds. It is in the context of the nature of the meaning of a sentence that Bhartṛhari is led to make certain statements of a much wider scope. After having disposed of the views of others regarding the nature of the meaning of a sentence, such as *saṁsarga*, *kriyā*, and *prayojana*, he declares that it is in the nature of *pratibhā*. In other words, the meaning of a sentence is *pratibhā*.

2. When we have understood the meanings of the words of a sentence, a flash of understanding of the meaning of the whole sentence takes place.[7] It is sometimes understood even before the whole sentence is uttered. It is not easy to explain this flash

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7. विच्छेदग्रहणेऽर्थानां प्रतिमान्यैव जायते ।
वाक्यार्थं इति तामाहुः पदार्थैरुपपादिताम् ॥ *Vāk.* II. 143.

of understanding to others. But one cannot, for that reason, deny its existence. It is a matter of one's own experience. Everybody experiences it without being able to define it properly to oneself, what to say of explaining it to others.[8] Even though it is indefinable we can see its effect and other circumstances connected with it. Its chief effect is that it connects together the meanings conveyed by the words of a sentence. It relates to the sentence as a whole on which it rests.[9] The meanings of the individual words manifest it. If they did not, their cognition in the middle would serve no useful purpose. Thus, even though this Intuition (*pratibhā*), is indefinable, we can see its effect : we know what manifests it and where it rests.

It is something which arises spontaneously in all beings. It is like the power of intoxication which some substances develop when they become mature, without anything special being done to them.[10] It is due to this *pratibhā* that birds and animals engage in their natural activities, without any prompting or instruction. It is because of it that birds build their nests when the time comes; and the cuckoo sings in spring.[11] It is clear from all this that, as conceived by Bhartṛhari, *pratibhā* is something very comprehensive. It is a flash of understanding which takes in a situation and prompts one to do something to meet the situation.[12] One acts immediately without being conscious of doing any reflection in the middle. If one sees a pool of water on a very hot day, one instinctively goes and takes a dip in it. One does not pause to reflect. *Pratibhā* includes intelligence of

8. इदं तदिति सान्येषामनाख्येया कथंचन ।
प्रत्यात्मवृत्तिसिद्धा सा कर्त्रापि न निरूप्यते ॥ *Vāk*. II. 144.
9. उपश्लेषमिवार्थानां सा करोत्यविचारिता ।
सार्वरूप्यमिवापन्ना विषयत्वेन वर्तते ॥ *Vāk*. II. 145.
10. यथा द्रव्यविशेषाणां परिपाकैरयत्नजाः ।
मदादिशक्तयो दृष्टाः प्रतिभास्तद्वतां तथा ॥ *Vāk*. II. 148.
11. स्वरवृत्तिं विकुरुते मधौ पुंस्कोकिलस्य कः ।
जन्त्वादयः कुलायादिकरणे केन शिक्षिताः ॥ *Vāk*. II. 149.
12. प्रमाणत्वेन तां लोकः सर्वः समनुपश्यति ।
समारम्भाः प्रतायन्ते तिरश्चामपि तद्वशात् ॥ *Vāk*. II. 147.

a very high order, intuitive knowledge, the instinct of animals and birds, and even the spontaneo us activities of newly born babies. This kind of knowledge is far more reliable. It comes from within. While speaking about it, Puṇyarāja reminds us of Kālidāsa's statement that, when in doubt, cultured people rely on the voice of their own conscience. It was an inner *pratibhā* that told Duṣyanta that Śakuntalā was fit to be married to a Kṣatriya.[13] The knowledge that one's conscience gives is *pratibhā*; and everybody accepts it as authority.

This *pratibhā* arises in us in many ways. Among them, Bhartṛhari recognizes six causes, and therefore six kinds of Intuition. The six causes are: *svabhāva*, *caraṇa*, *abhyāsa*, *yoga*, *adṛṣṭa*, and *viśiṣṭopahita*.[14] The kārikā itself does not give examples of these six kinds. Some are easy to understand while others are less so. It is natural for us to turn to the earliest commentary, the *Vṛtti*, in such cases, to see what kind of examples are given there, especially as the tradition looks upon it as Bhartṛhari's own work. Unfortunately, the text of the *Vṛtti* here is doubtful in some places. As for Puṇyarāja, after having given a very banal example of the first kind, he dismisses the remaining five by saying that the reader can guess other examples himself.[15]

The first cause of *pratibhā* is *svabhāva* (Nature). Here one would naturally think of the instinctive knowledge of animals and birds, which enables them to engage in activities appropriate to their species. In fact, Puṇyarāja gives the example of the monkey and its activities.[16] It is, therefore, interesting to see that the earliest commentary, the *Vṛtti*, gives other examples of intuition arising out of *svabhāva*. The first example is that of Primordial Matter (*parā prakṛtiḥ*), showing predisposition to

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13. See Puṇyarāja on *Vāk.* II. 147 and Kālidāsa's *Śākuntalam*. Act. I. I9.

14. स्वभावचरणाभ्यासयोगादृष्टोपपादिताम् ।
विशिष्टोपहितां चेति प्रतिभां षड्विधां विदुः ॥ *Vāk.* II. 152.

15. Puṇyarāja on *Vāk.* II. 152.

16. स्वभावेन यथा कपिः ।

evolve into *mahat* consisting of mere existence. This example is a little surprising. Matter is, after all, inert (*jaḍa*); and one associates *pratibhā* with the living, with what has consciousness, in howsoever rudimentary form. It is compared in the *Vṛtti* to the spontaneous waking up of one who was in deep sleep. The association of deep sleep with its effect (*ānanda*?) is also mentioned in this connection, though its relevance is not clear.[17] The next cause of *pratibhā* is said to be *caraṇa*. This word usually means a Vedic school. The text of the *Vṛtti* where the example is given is uncertain; but it may refer to the intuition of Vasiṣṭha and others, who acquired special illumination by strictly observing the prescriptions of their Vedic schools.[18] Such observance has always been considered to be the cause of spiritual merit, resulting in a special capacity to know things, which others cannot know. The next cause of intuition is *abhyāsa* (practice). Again by making a tentative amendation to the text of the *Vṛtti*, one can perhaps say that there is a reference to the knowledge of those who can tell where water can be found for digging a well or a tank.[19] It is not everybody who can tell that. It requires long practice before one can become an expert in such prediction. The word *abhyāsa* comes in another context where also the knowledge of an expert is involved. The context is the unreliability of inferential knowledge or knowledge obtained by reasoning, and the superiority of some other kinds of knowledge which cannot be set aside by mere reasoning. Here it is said that the knowledge of experts, who can tell the genuineness of precious stones and of coins, is of a superior nature; and cannot be identified with inferential knowledge. How do they acquire this knowledge? Through *abhyāsa* (practice), we are told. What is especially denied is that it is inferential knowledge. One can see

17. परस्याः [प्रकृतेः प्र]थमं सत्तालक्षणमात्मानं महान्तं प्रत्यानुगुण्यम् सुषुप्तावस्थस्येव प्रबोधानुगुण्यम् फलसत्तामात्रं निद्रायाः ॥ *Vāk.* II. 152.

18. चरणनिमित्ता काचित् प्रतिभा । तद्यथा का[च]रणेनैत्रावधृतप्रकाशविशेषाणां (वसिष्ठादीनाम्) । *Vṛtti* on *Vāk.* II. 152.

19. अभ्यासनिमित्ता काचित् । तद्यथा कूपतटाकादिखनकानाम् ।
Vṛtti on *Vāk.* II. 152.

that there is some resemblance between the knowledge of one who can tell where water can be found and that of one who can guarantee the genuineness of precious stones. Bhartṛhari does not use the word *pratibhā* in regard to the latter, but insists that it arises through *abhyāsa* (practice), mentioned by him as one of the causes of *pratibhā*. Another noteworthy point is that this knowledge of genuineness is said to be indefinable, and therefore, incapable of being conveyed to others (*pareṣāṁ asamākhyeyam*). We already know that this is a characteristic of all knowledge resulting from *pratibhā*. Vṛṣabhadeva insists that the expert's knowledge of the genuineness of precious stones cannot come under *pratyakṣa*, or *anumāna*, or *āgama*. It is not *pratyakṣa* because it is not caused by the mere contact of the senses with the object. It is not inference because it is not based on any ground of inference (*liṅga*). It is not *āgama* because it cannot be communicated to others, nor was it conveyed to the expert by the words of others, whereas traditional knowledge can be so conveyed. The next cause of *pratibhā* is said to be *yoga*. It is said that through *yoga* one can know what is going on in other people's minds.[20] What is called *adṛṣṭa* is mentioned next as a cause of *pratibhā*. It is an invisible force generated by one's own deeds in the previous lives. It determines many things in one's present life. Among them is its power to confer special knowledge on some. The example given in the *Vṛtti* is the power of Rakṣas and Piśāca-s, which enables them to enter into the bodies of others, and to make themselves invisible. It might be said that this is a case of the invisible force resulting in a power to do unusual things, and in a special knowledge. It is, therefore, necessary to take this with what Bhartṛhari says in the other context, namely, that of the unreliability and the consequent inferiority of knowledge produced by reasoning. There we are told that the *pitṛ-s*, the *rakṣas* and the *piśāca-s* get some cognitions which are different from perceptive, inferential, and traditional knowledge; and which are the result of the force created by their deeds in their previous

20. योगनिमित्ता काचित् । तद्यथा योगिनामव्यभिचारेण पराभिप्रायज्ञानादिषु ।
Vṛtti on *Vāk*. II. 152.

lives (*adṛṣṭa*).[21] The *Vṛtti* here explains that deaf people hear sounds in their sleep, and that some persons can see minute things inside houses through thick walls without breaking them. This knowledge is attributed to their *adṛṣṭa*. The fact that, in these two contexts, *adṛṣṭa* is described as giving special knowledge as well as capacity to do something special, shows its twofold character: intuitive knowledge of a situation plus the capacity to act in that situation. Lastly, there is the *pratibhā* caused by the grace of a special person (*viśiṣṭopahita*). The example given is that of the special knowledge which Dvaipāyana gave to Sañjaya and others at the time of the Mahābhārata war, so that they could see the war incidents scattered over a wide area, in their totality and in their details.

Thus it is clear that *pratibhā* has been conceived in a very comprehensive way. It is something which comes from within, is found in all beings from animals and birds at one end and Ṛṣi-s like Vasiṣṭha at the other. Everybody accepts its authority.

Now we have to see what Bhartṛhari has to say about the source of *pratibhā*. From where does everybody get it? There are some statements in the *Vākyapadīya* in different contexts having a bearing on this question; and one has to see to what extent these statements present a single coherent view. After having described the *pratibhā* of animals and birds, and the activities which it gives rise to, Bhartṛhari says (i) that it comes from Āgama, understood by Puṇyarāja in the sense of *śabda*; (ii) that it is accompanied by *bhāvanā*; and (iii) that Āgama is differentiated according as it is proximate (*āsatti*) or distant (*viprakarṣa*). Each of these points requires elucidation. At the other end of the scale, it is stated that the knowledge of the Ṛṣi-s is also based on *āgama*.[22]

What is this *āgama* which is common to animals and birds at one end and to the Ṛṣi-s at the other? The implication is that

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21. तथा काञ्चिददृष्टनिमित्ता । तद्यथा रक्षःपिशाचादीनां परप्रवेशान्तर्धानादिषु ।
Vṛtti on *Vāk.* II. 152.

22. ऋषीणामपि यज्ज्ञानं तदप्यागमपूर्वकम् । *Vāk.* I. 30.

it exists in everybody. It is said to be accompanied by *bhāvanā*. We are here reminded of the word *śabdabhāvanā*, which is mentioned in another context. Bhartṛhari has used that expression in connection with newly-born babies. It is because of *śabdabhāvanā* that the newly-born baby is able to make the first movement of the vocal organs or even to breathe.[23] It is because of it that the air coming out of the baby's mouth is able to strike at the different points of articulation and produce sounds. It is stated to be eternal, and to be the residual trace of the use of words in its previous birth. The baby is able, not only to move its vocal organs, but also to understand and to will. The movement which it makes presupposes a certain will and effort involving the mind. It is not due to any instruction that the baby is able to make these movements, but due to its own *pratibhā*, says the *Vṛtti*, while explaining the word *śabdabhāvanā*. From the way in which the subject matter is treated in this context, the *śabdabhāvanā*, that is, the residual trace of the use of words in previous lives, is the cause of *pratibhā*. Thus in the case of babies, their *pratibhā* comes from *śabdabhāvanā*. As animals and birds resemble newly-born babies in not knowing any language, it must be assumed that in their case also the *pratibhā* has the same source. Bhartṛhari actually brackets babies and animals together in one context.[24] Āgama, as the source of *pratibhā*, would thus seem to stand for *śabdabhāvanā* (or *bhāvanā*, for short) in the case of all beings who do not know any language, but who yet understand and act. It remains to see what *āgama* means in the case of average persons who know a language, and in the case of Ṛṣi-s and Śiṣṭa-s. Residual traces of the use of word in previous lives exist in their case also. But they have also learnt a language. We have seen how intuition is aroused when one hears sentences uttered by others. In the case of adults, therefore, residual traces and the hearing of the words

23. आद्य: करणविन्यासः प्राणस्योर्ध्वं समीरणम् ।
स्थानानामभिघातश्च न विना शब्दभावनाम् ॥ *Vāk.* I. 114.

24. अभ्यासात् प्रतिभाहेतुः शब्दः सर्वोऽपरैः स्मृतः ।
बालानां च तिरश्चां च यथार्थप्रतिपादने ॥ *Vāk.* II. 117.

of others work together in order to awaken the *pratibhā*. In other words, *āgama* or the word is very near to them (*āsatti*). In the case of babies and animals, the residual traces alone are responsible for the awakening of the *pratibhā*. But they are, after all, the result of the repeated use of words in previous lives, so that when an intuition is aroused by them, it is really aroused by words. The difference is that, in this case, the word is very distant (*viprakarṣa*). In the case of adults, who know the language, it is directly aroused by the words, (*sākṣāc*) *chabdena janitām*. That words are the cause of the awakening of the *pratibhā* is the first statement that Bhartṛhari makes in this context; and he seems to have used the word *śabda* in its widest possible sense to include even the residual traces of the use of words in previous lives.[25] One must, however, remember that while the meaning understood from words is always in the nature of *pratibhā*, one cannot maintain that, according to Bhartṛhari, it is always aroused that way and in no other. He has enumerated six causes for the awakening of *pratibhā*; and some of them do not involve the use of words at all. *Svabhāva* is one of them; and if the singing of the cuckoo in spring is an example of it, it does not involve the use of words. Nor can there be any use of words when the Yogin understands what is going on in the minds of others.

So far *pratibhā* has been considered in relation to ordinary human beings, babies, animals and birds. The words *āgama* and *bhāvanā* have also been discussed in relation to them. *Āgama* has been taken in the sense of word in general and *bhāvanā* has been understood as the residual trace, found in all beings, of the repeated use of words in previous lives. But we have still to consider the use of the word *āgama* in other contexts. We saw that it has been stated that the extraordinary perception which Ṛṣi-s have is due to *āgama*. The word is also commonly used in the *Vākyapadīya* for tradition, chiefly written Tradition, Śruti

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25. साक्षाच्छब्देन जनितां भावनानुगमेन वा ।
इतिकर्तव्यतायां तां न कश्चिदतिवर्तते ॥ *Vāk.* II. 146.

and Smṛti, but it would also include the beliefs and conduct of cultured people (*śiṣṭāḥ*) coming down from times immemorial, even if not committed to writing. It has been declared to be eternal, something that shines uninterruptedly like one's own consciousness.[26] Those, who take such an *āgama* as authority, do not allow themselves to be deflected from their path by the arguments of those who rely on reasoning only. We saw how Bhartṛhari speaks with respect about the knowledge of the expert, born of his practice (*abhyāsa*) which enables him to guarantee the genuineness of precious stones. But there are some persons, other than these experts, who are sometimes called Ṛṣi-s and sometimes Śiṣṭas; and who are credited with a special insight into things, which other people cannot see. They are persons whose impurities have been burnt away by austerities (*tapas*), and whose cognitions are free from all limitations. They can see the past and the present. Their vision is divine (*ārṣam cakṣuḥ*). They can see things which are beyond our senses and our mind.[27]

The *Vṛtti* enumerates some examples of things which they can see and ordinary persons cannot. They are: the Supreme Inner Controller, the atoms, the Unmanifested and undifferentiated Word-Principle (*śabdatattva*), the gods, and the residual traces generated by action leading to some particular, and to no other, results.[28] Helārāja discusses elaborately in order to prove the

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26. (अ) चैतन्यमिव यश्चायमविच्छेदेन वर्तते ।
आगमस्तमुपासीनो हेतुवादैर्न बाध्यते ॥ *Vāk.* I. 41.

(ब) तथैवायं श्रुतिस्मृतिलक्षणः सर्वैः शिष्टैः परिगृहीत आगमः ।
Vṛtti on *Vāk.* I. 41.

(क) वेदवाक्यानि तु चैतन्यवदपौरुषेयाणि । *Vṛtti.* on *Vāk.* I. 124.

27. आविर्भूतप्रकाशानामनुपप्लुतचेतसाम् ।
अतीतानागतज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षान्न विशिष्यते ॥
अतीन्द्रियानसंवेद्यान् पश्यन्त्यार्षेण चक्षुषा ।
ये भावान् वचनं तेषां नानुमानेन बाध्यते ॥ *Vāk.* I. 37-38.

28. अन्तर्यामिणमणुग्राममभिजातिनिमित्तनिबन्धनमनभिव्यक्तं शब्दब्रह्म शक्त्यधिष्ठानं देवताः कर्मणामनुबन्धपरिणामशक्तिवैकल्यानि, सूक्ष्ममातिवाहिकं शरीरं पृथगन्यांश्च तीर्थप्रवा-

(*Continued on the next page*)

existence of such exceptional individuals while explaining Bhartṛhari's statement that they can see the universals of objects with all their senses. They can also see the eternal connection of these universals with their words and are in a position to teach it to others. It is interesting to note that Bhartṛhari compares their knowledge to that of experts who can tell the genuineness of precious stones.[29] It is practice which enables them to attain their skills. All knowledge tends to reach a higher degree by practice. Whatever admits of degree reaches its climax somewhere; and knowledge reaches its climax in the Omniscient. This argument is already found in the *Vyāsabhāṣya* on the *Yogasūtras*, which are quoted by Helārāja in this context.[30]

How does it happen that some people are endowed with a special vision? We have already seen that it is attributed to *āgama*. What is emphasized is that it is not absolutely spontaneous. If it were so, there is no reason why everybody should not have the same divine vision. It is due to spiritual merit (*dharma*) which they had accumulated by strictly observing the injunctions of the Tradition (*āgama* or *āmnāya*). If it were absolutely spontaneous all these injunctions would become quite useless. They have been laid down in order that men may follow them strictly, acquire spiritual merit, and enjoy the fruits thereof. That is what Bhartṛhari means by saying that *āgama* or *āmnāya* is the cause of the divine vision of the sages. The causality is as follows : *āgama* > *dharma* > *jñāna*.[31]

Thus the *āgama* which is the cause of the inner source of knowledge which exists in all, namely, the *pratibhā*, has to be

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(*Continued from the last page*)

देषु प्रसिद्धानर्थान् रूपादिवद् इन्द्रियैरग्राह्यान् सुखादिवत् प्रत्यात्मसंवेद्यान् ये शिष्टा व्यावहारिकादन्येनैव चक्षुषा मुक्तसंशयमुपलभन्ते तेषामनुमानविषयतातीतं ज्ञानं व्यभिचारिभिरनुमानैरपाकर्तुमशक्यम् । *Vṛtti* on *Vāk.* I. 38.

29. ज्ञानं त्वस्मद्विशिष्टानां तासु सर्वेन्द्रियं विदुः ।
अभ्यासान्मणिरूप्यादिविशेषेष्विव तद्विदाम् ॥ *Vāk.* III. *JātiS.* 46.

30. See *Vyāsabhāṣya* on *YogaS.* I. 25.

31. ऋषीणामपि यज्ज्ञानं तदप्यागमपूर्वकम् । *Vāk.* I. 30.

understood somewhat differently in the case of animals and birds at one end and the Ṛṣis at the other, though it is the same principle right through. In trying to understand it in relation to the sages we have found that it means the Tradition, that is, Śruti and Smṛti and the Dharma which it teaches. It is, therefore, necessary to consider what Bhartṛhari says about *āgama* as Śruti and Smṛti. The first thing to note is that for him the Śruti is eternal, and not the word of any person (*apauruṣeya*). Though eternal, it is not so in the Mīmāṁsā sense. The Mīmāṁsakas do not believe in the cyclic character of the Universe. Divisions of Time such as *yuga*, *manvantara*, *kalpa* and so on do not exist for them. They do not, therefore, believe in *pralaya* (Cosmic dissolution), which, according to those who accept it, takes place at the end of a cycle. The Cosmos is eternal and it has always been full of differentiation as we see it now. *Na kadācid anīdṛśaṁ jagat* (the universe is never different from what it is now) is their principle. As the whole cosmos has no beginning, similarly, Śruti (Scripture) also has had no beginning; and it has come down to us in an unbroken succession. It is not the work of any person (*akartṛkā*).[32] Smṛti (Tradition) resembles Śruti in that it has also come down in an unbroken succession; but it is known to have been composed at different times by different persons. Bhartṛhari seems to be anxious to emphasize in the very next stanza that he held a different view on this subject. According to the *Vṛtti* he believed in the cyclic view of creation and dissolution, and in the emergence of Śruti and Smṛti at the end of every *pralaya*, and at the beginning of every creation. I shall come to this point a little later. After having stated the nature of Brahman, he declares that the Veda is the means of attaining it. The Brahman is essentially *śabdatattva*, the Word-Principle. He adds that the Veda is the *anukāra* of Brahman, a point which will be elaborated presently. Though it is really One, it has been handed down to us in a differentiated form. It

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32. अनादिमव्यवच्छिन्नां श्रुतिमाहुरकर्तृकाम् ।
शिष्टैर्निबध्यमाना तु न व्यवच्छिद्यते स्मृतिः ॥ *Vāk.* 1, 136.

is of four kinds, to start with: Ṛk, Yajus, Sāman and Atharvan; and each of these has several recensions or schools or branches. Another differentiation of the One consists of the different ways in which the text of the Veda has been handed down: Saṁhitā, Pada, Krama and so on. The handing down of the Veda in different branches and recensions is due to the gradually decreasing capacity of man and the consequent inability to grasp the Veda as One, as a whole. Though handed down in different branches, it teaches one ritual; and the branches supplement one another in order to give a complete idea of the ritual. Here the analogy given is that of Āyurveda which, we are told, was one at first; but due to the decreasing capacity of man was divided into many branches, though they all teach the same thing, namely, the treatment of diseases and restoration of health. The Veda then, One at the time of creation, is later diversified, due to the incapacity of man; and again becomes One at the time of Dissolution (*pralaya*). All this is based on the cyclic view of the creation and dissolution of the cosmos.

As said before, the Veda is not only the means of attaining Brahman, but is also the *anukāra*, the Image of it. Really speaking, the Veda is Brahman itself. To speak about it as an Image or Symbol is a metaphor. The *Vṛtti* explains the idea of *anukāra* by saying that the Ṛṣi-s who had acquired *dharma* see the ultimate and eternal Word-Principle (*nityā vāk*) in the form of mantras. Wishing to communicate it to their successors who could not realise *dharma*, they give them the Veda which is an image of the mantras.[33] The ultimate Word-Principle, which is One and without any inner sequence, cannot be imparted to others in that condition. Only an image or symbol of it can be imparted and that is the Veda. Just as the forms, which one sees in a dream, are images or symbols of the forms, which one sees in the external world in the wakeful state, in the same way,

33. यां मूक्ष्मां नित्यामतीन्द्रियां वाचमृषयः साक्षात्कृतधर्माणो मन्त्रदृशः पश्यन्ति तामसाक्षात्कृतधर्मभ्योऽपरेभ्यः प्रवेदयिष्यमाणा बिल्मं समामनन्ति स्वप्नवृत्तमिव दृष्टश्रुतानुभूतमाचिख्यासन्त इत्येष पुराकल्पः । *Vāk.* I. p. 24. ll. 2ff.

the Veda is an image of the Mantras, that is, the Word-Principle which the Ṛṣis, who had realised the Dharma, had seen. The analogy of dream-experience has been taken by the *Vṛtti* on *Vāk*. I. 5. from the kārikā itself namely *Vāk*. I. 137. But this idea of the origin of the Veda goes back to Yāska, who has something to say in the *Nirukta* on the transmission of the Veda-s and the Vedāṅga-s. What Yāska says, as interpreted by Durgācārya, may be stated briefly as follows :

The first Ṛṣi-s realised *dharma*, that is, they acquired it. It is implied that they acquired the Mantras also, without being taught by anybody. Their successors were of inferior calibre; and could neither realise the *dharma* nor acquire the Mantras by themselves. To them, the first Ṛṣi-s imparted the Mantras by establishing the relation of teacher and pupil. This second batch of Ṛṣi-s thus got the Mantras by listening to the words of their teachers. They are, therefore, *Śrutarṣayaḥ* (Ṛṣi-s through instruction). As man's capacity went on decreasing, the Ṛṣi-s began to worry as to how they could transmit their knowledge to future generations. So far, they had been able to preserve the unity of the Veda for the sake of facility in learning. They also handed down the auxiliary sciences of the Vedas (the Vedāṅga-s). The Veda was divided into different branches and schools. The Vedāṅga-s such as Vyākaraṇa and Nirukta were also handed down, diversified into schools. The word *bilma*, if derived from the root *bhid* (to divide), stands for the diversification of the Veda; and, if derived from the root *bhās* (to illuminate), it stands for the light which the auxiliary sciences throw on the Veda.[34]

Now Yāska says all this in order to establish the authority of the *Nirukta* as a Vedāṅga coming down from time immemorial; and composed by the very Ṛṣi-s who have been mentioned by Yāska, in a descending order of spiritual and intellectual power.

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34. साक्षात्कृतधर्माण ऋषयो बभूवुः। तेऽवरेभ्योऽसाक्षात्कृतधर्मभ्य उपदेशेन मन्त्रान् सम्प्रादुः। उपदेशाय ग्लायन्तोऽवरे बिल्मग्रहणायेमं ग्रन्थं समाम्नासिषुर्वेदं वेदाङ्गानि च बिल्मं भिल्मं भासनं वा। (Yāska-*Nirukta*. I, 20). *Vāk*. p. 24, ll. 5 ff.

That the *Vṛtti* was influenced by the *Nirukta* in the interpretation of *Vāk*. I. 5 and 137 is shown by the fact that, in the explanation of the former stanza, the relevant passage from the *Nirukta* is actually quoted, and that in the explanation of the later stanza there is a reference to three kinds of Ṛṣi-s. What the *Vṛtti* says about the three kinds of Ṛṣi-s is not identical with what the *Nirukta* says about them; but the two points made in the *Nirukta*, namely, (i) the three kinds of Ṛṣi-s, and (ii) the diversification of the One Veda into many branches and schools, are mentioned in the *Vṛtti* also. What the *Vṛtti* says may be stated briefly as follows : though the extremely unsatisfactory text of the *Paddhati* on this passage diminishes considerably its usefulness.

The purpose of *Vāk*. I. 137 is to point out that the *āgama*, that is Śruti and Smṛti, suffer an eclipse at the time of every *pralaya*; and are remanifested at the time of every creation, a position very different from that of the Mīmāṁsaka-s. This presupposes that the ultimate eternal cause works in the manner of fully differentiated individuals by means of sleep and wakefulness, the merging of everything within itself being sleep and the emerging of everything out of itself being wakefulness. When creation begins and the Intuition (*pratibhā*) of the whole emerges, some Ṛṣi-s also emerge at the same time, see this *pratibhā*, and become One with it. As this *pratibhā* has within it the seeds of everything that is to be, these Ṛṣi-s have a knowledge of everything. Some other Ṛṣi-s emerge when *vidyā* emerges. They become One with the mind and the senses which are closely connected with *vidyā*. Just as one sometimes hears sounds in a dream though the sense of hearing is not working, in the same way these Ṛṣi-s see the whole Veda having the power of unity and diversity with their *prajñā* (pure mind). A third set of Ṛṣi-s observe the properties of things, beneficial or harmful to man; and also see hints (*liṅgāni*) of the same in the Veda; and compose the Smṛti, containing injunctions relating to visible and invisible results. As for the Śruti, it is at first imparted as seen by the Ṛṣi-s, that is,

as a whole and undiversified; and later it is imparted diversified into branches and schools.[35]

Thus one can see that the emergence and transmission of the Veda and the role of the Ṛṣi-s in it, as described in the *Vṛtti* and the Kārikā, is an adaptation of what Yāska says. What we have to note is that we can now understand better what Bhartṛhari means when he says that the extraordinary perception of the Ṛṣi-s is due to *āgama*. At the very beginning of creation, the Ṛṣi-s emerge together with the *pratibhā* and become One with it. They see the *āgama*, the Śruti and Smṛti, either with their *pratibhā* or with their *prajñā*. If with the former, the mind does not play any part in it; and if with the latter, the mind plays a part in it. Though it appears that the *pratibhā* or *āgama* of the Ṛṣi-s is spontaneous, it is really not so, because it is the result of their strict observance (in their previous lives) of the *dharma* taught in the Śruti.[36] If it were absolutely spontaneous, all teaching of particular modes of conduct found in the Vedas would be useless, as already pointed out before.

From what has been said before it is clear that what Śruti and Smṛti transmit is that pure knowledge which is one with one of the aspects of the *śabdatattva*. This knowledge includes, among other things, a knowledge of what the right thing to do is, what leads to *dharma*, and what leads to *adharma*. It has been said that the Ṛṣi-s compose the Smṛti-s after having examined the properties of things beneficial or otherwise to man, and after

35. अविभागाद् विवृत्तानामभिख्या स्वप्नवच्छ्रुतौ ।
भावतत्त्वं तु विज्ञाय लिङ्गेभ्यो विहिता स्मृतिः ॥ *Vāk.* I. 137.

36. येषां तु स्वप्नप्रबोधवृत्त्या नित्यं विभक्तपुरुषानुकारितया कारणं प्रवर्तते तेषामृषयः केचित् प्रतिभात्मनि विवर्तन्ते सत्तालक्षणं महान्तमात्मानमविद्यायोनिं पश्यन्तः प्रतिबोधेनाभिसंभवन्ति । केचित्तु विद्यायां विवर्तन्ते । ते मनोग्रन्थिमात्मानमाकाशादिषु भूतेषु प्रत्येकं समुदितेषु वा विशुद्धमनिबद्धपरिकल्पं तथैवाभिसंभवन्ति।…ते च स्वप्न इवाश्रोत्रगम्यं शब्दं प्रज्ञयैव सर्वमाम्नायं सर्वभेदशक्तियुक्तमभिन्नशक्तियुक्तं च पश्यन्ति । केचित्तु पुरुषानुग्रहोपघातविषयं तेषामर्थानां स्वभावमुपलभ्याम्नायेषु क्वचित्तद्विषयाणि लिङ्गानि दृष्ट्वा दृष्टादृष्टार्थां च स्मृतिमुपनिबध्नन्ति । श्रुतिं तु यथादर्शनमव्यभिचरितशब्दामेव प्रथममविभक्तां पुनः संगृहीतचरणविभागां समामनन्तीत्यागमः ॥ *Vāk.* I. p. 226 f.

having seen indications of the same in the Vedas. That is how they come to know which object or action can lead to *dharma*, and which would lead to *adharma*. Only they can say that mere reasoning cannot lead us to knowledge. The Science of Grammar tells us about each word what its correct form is, the form which, when understood and used, can lead to *dharma*. It is through *āgama* that the Ṛṣi-s acquired this knowledge; and they have transmitted this knowledge to us through unbroken tradition. That is what gives the Vedāṅga called Vyākaraṇa its authority. It is the desire to establish this, which leads Bhartṛhari to make all these observations about the *pramāṇa-s* and about the emergence and transmission of the Śruti and the Smṛti.